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ABSTRACT
OUTPUT FLUCTUATIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GREAT RECESSION

SEPTEMBER 2014
GONZALO HERNANDEZ JIMENEZ, B.A., PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD
JAVERIANA
M.A., PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Arslan Razmi
This dissertation examines the short and long run effects of the Great Recession on Latin
America. For the short run, this study evaluates (i) the existence of a business cycle comovement between the US and Latin America, (ii) the role of the Latin American export
structure as an aspect that may amplify the growth spillover effects of the output
fluctuations in the US, and (iii) the terms of trade as a determinant of the short run output
fluctuations in Colombia, a primary commodity exporter that resembles the assumptions
of open small dependent economies. Consistent with the historical evidence, the US GDP
contraction in 2009 had a more severe short-run effect on non-primary commodity
exporters that have the US as a key export market. Econometric evidence also shows that
Latin America, on average, faces a process of decoupling with the US. China and other
developing economies have recently become more important geo-economic sources of
output fluctuations for Latin America. Regarding the long run, the dissertation identifies
that the Latin American economic growth has mainly been based on an export-led growth
regime. In particular, this study finds that the current account as a proportion of GDP is a
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positive and statistically significant correlate of economic growth. This growth regime is
vulnerable to a recent development of the world economy in the aftermath of the Great
Recession: shrinkage of global imbalances.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
This first chapter of the dissertation has two main objectives. It attempts (i) to
briefly describe some aspects of the recent Latin American economic context in order to
understand why Latin America, as a subset of the developing world, is an interesting case
study, and (ii) to introduce the main questions that will be studied in the following three
essays regarding the long- and short-run macroeconomic effects of the Great Recession
on Latin America.
For the first objective, it is worth noticing that in the last fifty years, Latin
America, in contrast to economically successful regions like East Asia, has been
generally characterized by macroeconomic instability and/or poor economic growth.
Indeed, the region witnessed an initial industrialization in the sixties and the seventies,
which was never consolidated; a “lost decade” in the eighties, as a result of the external
debt crisis; and a modest growth period in the nineties that ended up in a severe financial
crisis in 1999. Although this severe downturn at the end of the twentieth century was
certainly the result of a pervasive capital outflow from emerging markets, this episode not
only confirmed the reputation of the region regarding its instability and stagnation, but
also fostered and increasing debate on the free-market economic reforms (i.e. the trade
liberalization) that began being implemented in the nineties. In fact, while some
economists insisted on defending the reforms packet and even supported its more rapid
implementation, others portrayed the free-market economic principles of the so called
“Washington Consensus” as the base of a failing development strategy for Latin
America. Not surprisingly, for example, the political confrontation in the late nineties and
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the beginning of the 2000’s saw the appearance of a counter-reform attack as one of the
main issues addressed in the rhetoric and the political platforms of the leftist movements.
The left wing, in fact, gained control of many Latin American governments in that
period. Nevertheless, despite the debate about the reforms as hindering elements of the
Latin American development, some of these reforms, in particular those related to fiscal
and monetary discipline (i.e. the independence of the central banks), were effective in
improving the monetary stability of the region. For example, inflation, a major concern of
the region since the seventies, reached a historical low level in the beginning of the
2000’s after a declining trend that started in the nineties. It is worth noticing, however,
that this stability also reflected a weak aggregate demand regime consistent with low
economic growth rates.
Years 2003 to 2007 offered a different panorama. The United States, a main
export market for Latin American output, left behind the impact of its recession in 2001,
and the rapidly expanding Chinese economy emerged as a new engine of the world
economy that increased the demand for primary commodities produced in the developing
world (i.e. oil, coal, and other minerals). The price of these commodities skyrocketed,
giving a name to this period: the commodity price boom. Although conservative
monetary policies in some Latin American countries absorbed part of the positive terms
of trade shock, the region certainly benefited from this boom in the short-run. The terms
of trade shock provided, for example, a greater margin for an expansion of fiscal
expenditure without affecting the fiscal deficit goals. Likewise, current account surpluses
increased. This aspect meant a broader availability of financial funds to support
investment. In this period, the regional economy grew at rates comparable with the
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relatively favorable growth rates in the seventies, and Latin America accumulated foreign
currency reserves to prevent further attacks on the capital account like those that occurred
in 1999. However, in structural terms, this economic expansion was focused on capitalintensive sectors like oil and mining, and on services, particularly the financial sector.
Therefore, despite the period of satisfactory economic growth, Latin American
economies did not see a substantial improvement in employment rates in modern/formal
sectors.
Acknowledging the tension between the region’s macroeconomic achievements
after the eighties and the nineties and the still challenging social and economic conditions
in terms of unemployment, poverty and income inequality, The Economist, in September
2010, devoted a special report about the Latin American economy that was titled “So
near and yet so far”. The report is of course just an example of the increasing attention
that Latin America is receiving, in part due to a more dynamic role of the developing
world, but also due to particular regional aspects such as: the extended presence of leftist
governments; the new position of Brazil as the sixth biggest economy in the world, after
overtaking the UK; the fact that high commodity price levels in the last decade have
benefited the region as an aggregate (at least in the short run) but have not substantially
alleviated the poverty; and finally, regarding the apparent resilience of the region during
the financial crisis in the United States in 2008.
Four years after that report, the attention is now centered on the current political
and economic instability in Venezuela and Argentina, two countries that exemplify
potential economic policy trade-offs. In the case of Venezuela, despite the effectiveness
of its government to reduce poverty in the short-run, relative to other Latin American
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economies, this country has not taken advantage of the oil price boom to start-up the
conditions for a process of industrialization and diversification, which are necessary
conditions (not sufficient of course) for a long-run process of development and poverty
reduction. In the case of Argentina, its recent financial instability seems to be proving
costly the implementation of second-best policies as subsidies and exchange rate
manipulation to foster the development of the industrial sector and thus economic
growth. More generally, the optimism regarding the region’s resilience during the Great
Recession has curbed as well. Even though it had previously been pointed out by some
economists, it is clearer now that (i) the trade collapse, along with (ii) the reduction of the
region’s current account surpluses, rather than the immediate financial shock as a
consequence of the US financial crisis, are the main external macroeconomic aspects for
the region. These aspects that have recently characterized the world economy and are
currently challenging the Latin American macroeconomic performance motivate this
dissertation. In particular, this study assesses if Latin America may be in a vulnerable
position in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
The Great Recession in 2009, following the financial crisis in the United States
and other advanced economies, is an extraordinary macroeconomic event that is still
reshaping the trade and financial conditions in the world. The import growth deceleration
in industrialized countries, as a consequence of the income adjustment, has led to
shrinkage of the global imbalances. The reduction of these global imbalances not only
reflects smaller current account deficits in the advanced economies but also a lower
margin for developing countries to run current account surpluses. Although this global
trade/financial aspect has numerous implications in both industrialized and developing
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economies, it is worth noticing that Latin America and other developing economies are
under exceptional pressure since they have historically been constrained by the
international markets of goods and capital. Developing countries generally resemble the
assumptions of open and small economies; therefore, they are not able to exert any
market power in these international markets, which means that the access for the
developing world to export markets or to capital financing is mostly conditioned by the
macroeconomic performance in the industrialized economies. For example, while
expansionary periods in advanced economies are associated with expanding export
markets for the developing world, the size of these markets shrink during recessions,
which intensifies the degree of competition among developing countries to sell their
products.
These aspects may certainly constitute long- and short-run difficulties for
developing countries; in the long run, regarding the sustainability of their economic
growth regimes, especially if these regimes have especially relied on the economic
performance in industrialized economies; in the short-run, because negative income
shocks in advanced economies may rapidly propagate to developing economies through a
deterioration of terms of trade and/or a contraction of output as a consequence of a
weaker demand in industrialized economies export market.
More specifically, for the long-run, this dissertation consists of empirically
identifying whether the nature of the Latin American economic growth regime has been
tradable-led or export-led growth. The term tradable-led refers to idea that a structural
sectoral transformation towards the production of tradable goods, commonly industrial
goods, is a necessary condition for a developing economy to achieve higher productivity
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and a sustained path of economic growth. Given that this regime can be supported, in
terms of the demand side, by both domestic and external markets, the deceleration of
import growth in advanced economies, directly associated with the external markets, does
not necessarily become a binding constraint for a developing economy under this regime.
These developing economies might certainly continue a tradable-led growth regime
supported by the domestic markets. However, some developing economies may have
expanded their tradable sector through three strategies that involve exports as an
important component. These strategies, associated with the term export-led growth, are
the following (i) exporting manufacturing goods, regardless of the market destination, (ii)
exporting manufacturing goods to industrialized economies, or (iii) running current
account surpluses (net export-led growth). Although a detailed explanation on how these
regimes operate is formally presented in the next chapter, it may be noticed that case (i)
may eventually be resilient to the shrinkage of global imbalances and the deceleration of
import growth in advanced countries, since economies may potentially continue their
export strategy by exporting manufacturing to other developing economies. However,
cases (ii) and (iii) are clearly constrained under the recent conditions in the world
economy. Therefore, the identification of the main Latin American economic growth
engine may provide crucial insights about the vulnerability of the long-run
macroeconomic performance of the region.
Regarding the short-run, this dissertation examines the effect of the United States
business cycles on Latin America’s output fluctuations to evaluate if there is evidence
supporting the existence of an output co-movement between these two economies. This
approach acknowledges the predominant historical role of the US as an export market for
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Latin American output, and the role of trade-structure aspects that may intensify a
potential business cycle synchronization between Latin America and the US: (i) primary
vs. non-primary commodity exports, (ii) the importance of the United States as an export
market for each Latin American economy, and (iii) the role of Latin American
manufacturing exports to the United States. The analysis also attempts to describe if the
findings based on historical data (1961-2012) resemble the uneven performance of Latin
American economies during the Great Recession in 2009. Likewise, for a more specific
case of the short-run analysis, the dissertation examines the effect of terms of trade
shocks on output fluctuations in a primary commodity exporter: Colombia. Primary
commodity exporters are expected to be particularly affected by terms of trade shocks
when the world economy decelerates. This may occur, for example, because the price
elasticity of supply of primary commodities is lower than the price elasticity of supply of
manufacturing goods. Therefore, income shocks in the advanced economies translate into
terms of trade shocks on primary commodity exporters that may originate short-run
output fluctuations.
Following this introduction, Chapter 2, titled “Latin America after the Global
Crisis: The Role of Export-Led and Tradable-led Growth Regimes”, deals with the
evaluation of the long-run aspect of the Latin American economic performance
mentioned above. It examines the relative importance of two major economic growth
regimes: (i) export-led growth, and (ii) tradable-led growth in Latin America in preceding
years to the Great Recession. Using a panel data analysis, the study finds that the external
balance of goods and services as a proportion of GDP, associated with net export-led
growth is a robust variable explaining Latin American economic growth in the period
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1953-2009. This chapter also develops a simple dynamic model to help explain the main
finding through investment and saving behavior. The main finding leads to the
conclusion that the continuation of this growth path may be vulnerable in the aftermath of
the Great Recession due to the shrinkage of global imbalances, which, as mentioned
before, is one of the main aspects characterizing the current world economy. Chapter 3,
titled “Latin American Export Structure and the US growth spillover effect in the Great
Recession” finds that output fluctuations in Latin America are synchronized with the
United States’ business cycle in the period 1961-2012. Using a panel data analysis and
focusing on export-structure related aspects of the Latin American economies, the study
also finds that non-primary commodity exporters, and Latin American countries whose
exports have mainly been destined for the US market, display an intensified output
fluctuation co-movement with the US. In fact, these results address the uneven
performance of Latin American economies in the Great Recession as a consequence of
the real GDP contraction in the United States in 2009. Chapter 4, titled “Terms of trade
and output fluctuations in Colombia”, explores the importance of the terms of trade to
explain output fluctuations in Colombia, a developing country where almost two thirds of
the exports correspond to four commodities: oil, coal, coffee, and nickel. This chapter is
motivated by: (i) the particular role of short run fluctuations in developing economies, (ii)
the fact that the Colombian terms of trade are procyclical, and (iii) the discussion on
economic policies toward sterilization of the effects of commodities prices. Using time
series analysis for the period 1994 -2011, the study finds robust evidence indicating that
changes in the terms of trade explain around one third of Colombian quarterly growth.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the main concluding remarks from the three main essays.
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CHAPTER 2
LATIN AMERICA AFTER THE GLOBAL CRISIS: THE ROLE OF EXPORTLED AND TRADABLE-LED GROWTH REGIMES
2.1 Introduction
Latin America (LA) has never displayed rapid and sustained economic growth. In
contrast, for example, to the persistent high growth rates in East Asia since the 1960’s,
Latin America has witnessed two “lost decades” in the last fifty years, the first one in the
1980’s, marked by severe macroeconomic instability, and the second one in the 1990’s
with the “Washington Consensus” as the roadmap. Not surprisingly then, information
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) shows that while LA’s per capita income
was 50 percent higher than East Asia’s in 1970, the difference between the two regions
completely vanished in 2000. Even more dramatic is the comparison among Latin
American and East Asian economies that make part of the specific group of developing
economies in the WDI. The divergence in growth rates since the 1980’s helped
Developing East Asia reduce its GDP per capita gap with Developing Latin America
from 14 times (in favor of LA) in 1960 to just 2 times in 2010. More recently, in part
because of the commodity prices boom since 2003, the region experienced a favorable
scenario in the years preceding the Great Recession. Given this performance, similar to
the relatively good times in the 1960’s and the 1970’s, Latin America seemed to have left
behind its stagnation. However, optimism that accompanied this buoyancy was finally
curbed by the global financial crisis hitting in 2008.
What are Latin America’s economic growth prospects in the coming years? The
main attempt is to answer this question from an angle that acknowledges a combination
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of two elements: (i) Latin America faces new world economy constraints after the recent
global crisis, and (ii) the relevance of the external-related factors that currently
characterize the world economy (or how binding these constraints are) is conditional to
the nature of Latin America’s economic growth.
Regarding the new world economy, this study focuses on two features that are
direct consequences of the income and price adjustments following the global financial
crisis, which may be particularly important to the developing world. First, there is
shrinkage of global imbalances (Figure 2.1), which means that economies running current
account deficits are now reducing this deficit, while economies that were running positive
current account balances are now reducing their surplus. Although, on average, emerging
markets and developing economies have financed the current account deficits of the
advanced economies since 2000, as shown in Figure 2.1, 1 data from the World Economic
Outlook describes a remarkable reduction in the trade surpluses of developing economies
since 2009, with an expected downward trend over the next few years. Latin America is
not an exception in this pattern. A current account surplus of 1.5 percent of GDP in 2006
is expected to become a current account deficit of 2.4 percent of GDP in 2018. A second
aspect characterizing the world economy is the deceleration of industrialized countries’
import growth (Figure 2.2). Imports in advanced economies as a proportion of world’s
GDP reached a maximum of 22 percent in 2008; however, the expected ratio is lower
than 19 percent in coming years.

1

As noted in the literature, this pattern contradicts expectations from the basic
neoclassical model in which capital should flow from rich economies (with lower
investment returns) to poor economies (with higher investment returns).
10

In relation to the relevance of these external sector-related factors for Latin
America, it is important to notice that both aspects shrinkage of global imbalances and
the slowdown of advanced economies imports clearly become binding constraints for
Latin America if the nature of its economic growth either is based: (i) on running current
account surpluses, or (ii) on exporting to advanced economies (or both). Since these two
potential engines of growth involve exports or/and net exports as key elements, they have
been treated in the literature as interpretations of the term export-led growth.
Nevertheless, not all the variants of export-led growth would necessarily lead to a
pessimistic scenario for Latin America. For example, if the positive effects of exporting
on growth are destination neutral, an eventual substitution of export markets in other
developing economies for markets in industrialized countries might attenuate or even
offset the adverse effects of decelerating import growth in advanced economies.
As an alternative to export-led growth, it must be considered the possibility that
economic growth in developing economies follows the expansion of the tradable sector,
especially consisting of industrial goods, which may not only be fostered by exports or
net exports but also by non-external sector determinants. In economies under this growth
regime, called tradable sector-led growth, the idea of stronger domestic markets
substituting for external markets might lead to the implication that shrinking in global
imbalances and import growth deceleration in advanced economies should not
necessarily be binding constraints for economic growth either. If this is the case for Latin
America, the region might be less vulnerable than those economies more dependent on
the external sector-related determinants of growth.
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Since different potential growth paths lead to different implications for Latin
America in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the main approach to discuss Latin
America’s growth prospects consists of an econometric analysis that explores the relative
importance of the export-led growth compared to that of the growth path based on the
expansion of the tradable sector (tradable-led growth) in years preceding the global
financial crisis. This way, this study aims to evaluate the role of external sector-related
determinants of growth associated with export-led growth, in order to examine the
vulnerability of these potential growth determinants in the future, given shrinkage in
global imbalances and the slowdown of import growth in advanced economies. In section
4.2.2, the details of the implications that result from each growth regime are explained.
Section 4.2.3 outlines the empirical strategy that is developed to explore the existence of
any leading growth regime (or regimes). Since it is found that the current account balance
is a robust correlate of Latin America’s growth, among the regimes that are studied,
Section 4.2.4 provides a discussion of a potential mechanism by which the version of the
export-led growth known as net export-led growth operates. Finally, in section 4.2.5,
some concluding remarks are presented.
2.2 Export-led growth vs. Tradable-led growth
Rodrik (2009) provides empirical evidence in favor of the idea that successful
developing economies, achieving high rates of economic growth, have witnessed a
structural change from traditional sectors to modern activities. This transformation, based
on the expansion of output of tradable goods, is mainly associated with the development
of the industrial sector which fosters the reallocation of labor and capital from primary
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sectors to activities with higher levels of productivity. 2 This growth regime, in which the
tradable sector is the engine of economic growth, leads to an optimistic point of view in
the aftermath of the Great Recession, in the sense that neither shrinkage of global
imbalances nor the slowdown of advanced economies imports should necessarily be
binding for Latin American economies that are able to expand domestic markets in tune
with the development of the tradable sector. This paper refers to this particular growth
path as tradable-led growth (TRADABLE). As an alternative to the TRADABLE path,
scholars use the term export-led growth to refer to economic growth in developing
economies involving exports or net exports (i.e., current account surpluses) as key
elements in the growth recipe. Although permanently present in the economic literature
since the Mercantilists, the export-led growth path gained special attention in the
literature after the take-off of the Japanese economy and the Asian Miracle in the second
half of the twentieth century, and more recently in the literature on the outstanding
performance of the Chinese economy in terms of economic growth since the nineties.
Tradable-led growth and export-led growth, therefore, might be seen, to some
extent, as competing growth regimes, and not surprisingly then, the econometric analysis
in Rodrik (2009) is presented as a “horse-race” type set of regressions that explore the
relative importance of each growth path. Results in Rodrik (2009) show that the value
added of industry as a proportion of GDP (proxy for the tradable sector) is a robust
regressor of economic growth in developing economies after controlling for the inclusion
of two variables associated with export-led growth: (i) the share of exports in GDP,

2

In the context of several developing economies, the scope of the argument may be
extended to the benefits that industrialization brings in terms of the use of underemployed
economic resources (for example, labor).
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which may capture a source of economic growth when mechanisms as learning by
exporting or technological spillovers from exporting occur, and (ii) trade surplus as
percent of GDP, which reflects a source of net demand for tradable goods. Rodrik (2009)
concludes that the developing world may sustain its growth rates, in the aftermath of the
Great Recession, by expanding the tradable sector along with increases in domestic
demand. Given the expansion in domestic demand, neither the shrinkage in global
imbalances nor deceleration in advanced economies’ import growth should be seen as
very serious obstacles. In spite of the fact that undervaluation of the domestic currency,
one of Rodrik’s milestones in the tools to achieve industrialization and economic growth,
might be off the menu given the reduction of trade surpluses in developing economies,
second best policies, as direct subsidies that expand the production and domestic
consumption of tradable goods, might guarantee the continuation of the TRADABLE
path.
It is worth noting at this point that had the share of exports in GDP been the
“winner” in the “horse- race” regressions among competing growth regimes, prospects
for developing economies would not have necessarily been pessimistic either. For
example, Canuto et al (2010) pins down the existence of a process of decoupling between
developing countries and advanced economies. Developing economies are facing, to
some degree, a substitution of South-South trade for South-North trade. WDI data shows,
for example, that in 1960, for each dollar that the region exported to developing
economies, nine dollars were exported to high income economies. This has changed since
then. Latin American exports to developing economies accounted for 35 percent of the
total exports of merchandises in 2011. This type of substitution in South’s trade partners
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leads some economists to think that gains from exporting, mainly associated with
manufactured exports, might also be obtained from exporting to other developing
economies. Regarding this aspect, Hernandez and Razmi (2013) include in their “horserace” regressions the share of manufactured exports in GDP as a potential regressor of
economic growth in Asia. This variable is a proxy of a growth regime defined as
manufactured

export-led

growth

(MANUF_EXPORT),

which

is

a

particular

interpretation of export-led growth where the gains from exporting occur regardless of
the market destination. Results in Hernandez and Razmi (2013), however, did not support
the importance of this variant of the export-led growth path in Asia.
More interestingly, Hernandez and Razmi (2013) find that another variable, the
proportion of manufactured exports destined to industrialized countries, is the most
robust regressor of economic growth in Asia. This interpretation of export-led growth is
defined as industrialized country centered export-led growth (EXPORT_TO_INDUS). A
clear implication from the analysis in Hernandez and Razmi (2013) is that gains derived
from exporting are not destination neutral. This hypothesis has been studied in the
literature before. For example, Pack (2001) argues that meeting specific contractual
requirements in advanced economies, in a context of strong international competition,
necessarily required an increase in the East Asian exporters’ efficiency. Similarly, De
Loecker (2007) provides econometric evidence showing that Slovenian firms exporting to
high income countries benefit more, in terms of gains of productivity, than those firms
with a lower proportion of exports destined to advanced economies. This suggests that
developing countries able to orient its exports to markets in advanced economies benefit
more from technological spillovers, quality control, economies of scale, and learning by
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exporting, than those economies focused on exporting to developing markets. For the
EXPORT_TO_INDUS regime, shrinkage in global imbalances is not necessarily a
binding constraint but the slowdown of industrialized countries import growth clearly is.
A last interpretation of the export-led growth that would also lead toward a
pessimistic implication for Latin America and the developing world is known as net
export-led growth (NET_EXPORT). This interpretation refers basically to trade surpluses
as a source of net demand for domestic output. An excess of exports over imports means
an expansion of output, either through exportable sectors or through sectors producing
importable goods. In this case, while the deceleration of advanced economies import
growth does not necessarily affect the growth path, the expected reduction in trade
deficits in advanced economies implies a narrower margin for developing countries to run
current account surpluses. In the particular case of Latin America, a decomposition of the
trade balance in (i) trade balance with developed economies and (ii) trade balance with
developing economies for the period 1990-2010 shows that the average trade balance is
generally driven by the trade balance with advanced economies. Furthermore, Latin
America has been running a trade deficit with developing countries since the midnineties, and this trade deficit has been deteriorating with the exception only of year
2009, when imports fell by a greater magnitude than exports, as a consequence of the
income adjustment in Latin American economies.
It is important to notice that the relationship between trade surpluses and
economic growth can be interpreted in additional ways. By simple macroeconomic
accounting, the current account and the capital account are two sides of the same coin.
This means that a current account imbalance reflects the gap between domestic saving
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and investment. For example, a country running a trade deficit must be financing the
excess of imports over exports (or excess of demand for goods and services) with capital
inflows. Similarly, a current account surplus means that the domestic economy finances
other economies’ trade deficits. Therefore, a positive change in the current account
surplus means less net capital inflows, and also a larger positive gap between domestic
saving and investment. The effect of less net capital inflows on economic growth might
be theoretically neutral if one thinks that the source of financing is irrelevant and what
matters is the ability of the economy to fund investment projects either with domestic or
with external funds. The effect may, however, be positive if domestic saving is
particularly important for economic growth. For example, Prasad et al. (2007) find the
existence of a positive correlation between current account balances and economic
growth in nonindustrial economies, a result described as surprising because it contradicts
the assumption in conventional neoclassical theoretical models of developing economies
as saving constrained economies. The main theoretical argument supporting the negative
relationship between capital inflows and growth in Prasad et al. (2007) is that developing
countries have a limited capacity to absorb foreign resources due to underdevelopment in
financial institutions or due to the overvaluation of the domestic currency generated by
capital inflows. Implying a positive relationship between domestic saving and growth in
developing economies as well, Aghion et al. (2006) provide evidence that domestic
savings are significantly associated with: (i) total factor productivity growth in poor
countries, (ii) higher levels of foreign direct investment inflows, and (iii) equipment
imports. Domestic saving in this case is important to attract foreign investors who are
familiar with the frontier technology but need local banks to monitor local projects. In

17

other words, domestic saving and capital inflows complement each other. Nevertheless,
in opposition to the apparent positive effect of foreign direct investment, it could be
argued that net capital inflows, when these take the form of foreign direct investment
directed to primary sectors, may have long run negative effects on growth due to perverse
incentives against the structural change from traditional to modern activities (i.e, rent
seeking economies). Finally, a current account surplus, or the excess of savings over
investment, may be reflecting a higher profitability for domestic firms that may lead to
higher economic growth. In this sense, for example, favorable terms of trade shocks
might increase both the current account surplus and the rates of economic growth by
improving the profitability of domestic firms. This aspect might be especially important
during the last commodity prices boom.
To sum up, in this approach, the effects of shrinkage of global imbalances and the
slowdown of import growth in advanced economies on Latin America may depend on the
relative importance of four competing regimes of economic growth: (i) tradable-led
growth (TRADABLE), (ii) manufactured export-led growth (MANUF_EXPORT), net
export-led growth (NET_EXPORT), and industrialized country-centered export-led
growth (EXPORT_TO_INDUS).

The next section econometrically explores the

relevance of these regimes for Latin America.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
The relative importance of the different versions of export-led growth, and
tradable-led growth is examined with the following baseline regression for the dependent
variable: rate of real (chained) GDP per capita growth (GRGDPCH).
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GRGDPCH j ,t =
α + β 0 ln RGDPCH j ,t −1 + ∑ δ iTRADABLE j ,t −i
i =0

2

2

2

+ ∑ γ i MANUF _ EXPORT j ,t −i + ∑ λi NET _ EXPORT j ,t −i + ∑ π i EXPORT _ TO _ INDUS j ,t −i + ft + f j + ε j ,t

=i 0

=i 0=i 0

On the right hand side, the specification includes: (i) the real GDP per capita (RGDPCH)
in the previous period, to control for convergence, (ii) a proxy for the regime that is
called tradable-led growth (TRADABLE: value added in industry as a proportion of
GDP), (iii) a proxy for manufactured export-led growth (MANUF_EXPORT:
manufactured exports as a proportion of GDP), (iv) a proxy for net export-led growth
(NET_EXPORT: external balance of goods and services as a proportion of GDP), (v) a
proxy for industrialized country centered export-led growth (EXPORT_TO_INDUS:
manufactured exports destined to developed countries as a proportion of GDP). Finally
the regression includes time and country fixed effects (𝑓), and the error term (𝜀). The
subscripts j and t represent countries and time, while i (= 1, 2, …) reflects lags.

Table 2.1 summarizes the expectations, discussed in the previous section, for the
potential effects of the shrinkage of global imbalances and the deceleration of advanced
economies’ import growth depending on the particular growth regime. If Latin America’s
growth were based on the tradable-led growth regime, neither shrinking trade deficits in
industrialized economies nor the slowdown of import demand necessarily would lead to a
pessimistic scenario for the region, since policies oriented to the expansion of domestic
markets might eventually foster economic growth despite adverse international markets
conditions. In the case of the MANUF_EXPORT regime, prospects for growth are not
necessarily bad either. South-South trade might be a substitute for South-North trade. If
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net-export led growth is the relevant regime, shrinking demand in advanced economies is
not necessarily bad since falling exports do not necessarily mean a reduction in the
current account but shrinking trade deficits in advanced economies clearly means a
narrower margin for developing economies to run trade surpluses. Finally, if economic
growth is fostered by exports to industrialized economies, a constraint on running current
account surpluses is not binding but shrinking demand in advanced economies reflects
more limited markets in advanced economies for Latin American exports.
Data and sample definitions are described in Table 2.2. For TRADABLE,
MANUF_EXPORT, and NET_EXPORT, statistical information was obtained from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The definition for Industry used by
the WDI includes the following activities of the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC): (i) Mining and Quarrying, (ii) Manufacturing, (iii) Electricity, Gas,
and Water Supply, and (iv) Construction. The excluded sectors are basically Agriculture,
Fishing, and Services. For the construction of EXPORT_TO_INDUS, data were obtained
from the United Nation’s COMTRADE.
The sample consists of a maximum of 33 Latin American countries (LA-33), 20
advanced economies (OECD), and time series from 1953 to 2009. In order to remove
short run fluctuations, while taking into consideration the sample size constraints, this
paper uses the 3-year averages of the variables of interest. In addition to the sample LA33, three subsamples of countries are studied. First, LA-15, which consists of the largest
15 Latin American economies. The analysis focuses on this group of economies that
represents approximately 98 percent of the total Latin American GDP. Countries selected
for this subsample had a nominal GDP in 2006 that was higher than the median of the
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entire sample. Second, primary commodity exporters, consisting of countries where the
ratio primary exports/ merchandise exports was greater than the median for Latin
America (75.4 percent). Primary exports include agricultural raw materials, food, fuel,
and ores and metals exports. Finally, this paper examines a sample consisting of nonprimary exporters (LA-33 after excluding primary commodity exporters).
Table 2.3 summarizes the main descriptive statistics for the key variables for the
samples LA-33 and LA-15. Figure 3 provides the corresponding histograms for LA-15.
The descriptive statistics show that the average growth rate in Latin America for both
LA-33 and LA-15 is around two percent. 3 The maximum growth rate in the LA-15
sample is 10.49 percent (Trinidad and Tobago, 2007-09) and the minimum is -8.47
percent (Peru, 1989-1991). Most of the observations (76 percent) lie between the mean
and the mean plus/minus one standard deviation. In the case of industry as a proportion of
GDP, distributions for LA-33 and LA-15 are also quite similar in terms of maximum and
minimum values, and dispersion. The only slight difference is observed in the mean,
which is 33 percent for LA-15 and 29 percent for LA-33. As in the case of the dependent
variable, most of the observations for industry as a proportion of GDP in LA-15 (70
percent) lie between the mean and the mean plus/minus-one standard deviation. For
manufactured exports as a proportion of GDP, distributions for LA-15 and LA-33 are
also similar. However, while the maximum value in LA-15 corresponds to Costa Rica
(1998-2000) where manufactured exports as a proportion of GDP is 24.37 percent, the
mean in LA-33 is raised by Suriname in the nineties (59 percent in the period 1992-1994,
41.39 percent in 1995-1997, and 72.78 percent in 1998-2000). An important difference in
3

This growth rate is certainly lower than the rate in Asian economies (3 percent) studied
by Hernandez and Razmi (2013)
21

sample distributions appears for the external balance of goods and services as a
proportion of GDP. The average for this variable in LA-15 is close to zero percent.
However, for LA-33, the average current account deficit is 5.7 percent of GDP. This
difference is mostly explained by some Caribbean economies (Dominica, Grenada, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) that have had periods
where the current account deficit has been lower than -30 percent of the GDP. Finally,
the distributions for the proxy for EXPORT_TO_INDUS do not show substantial
differences in the LA-15 and the LA-33 samples. The variable ranges from 1.51 percent
(Guatemala, 1968-1970) to 94.48 percent for Mexico (1998-2000), not surprising for a
country that has concentrated its exports to the United States for long time.
As part of the econometric strategy, first Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates
for the baseline regression are obtained. These estimates may, however, be biased.
Variables in the specification may not be orthogonal to the error term because the rate of
growth might simultaneously determine the regimes. For example, a current account
deficit as a proportion of GDP might be the result of a higher growth rate. Similarly,
higher economic growth may foster faster industrialization, or increased manufactured
exports might be preceded by higher levels of productivity achieved through economic
growth. Besides this source of endogeneity, the proxies for the strategies may show
persistence over time and have lagged effects on the dependent variable. Therefore, given
the interest in exploring the causality running from the regimes to growth in the per
capita real GDP, this study estimates dynamic panel data models based on the ArellanoBover General Method of Moments (GMM). These GMM specifications include the
lagged dependent variable. After making a particular assumption of steady state, this term
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is useful to calculate the long run effect of the variables. 4 For the set of instruments, lags
of the dependent variable and the third lags of the key variables are used. The Sargan test
of over-identified restrictions is used to test the validity of the instruments.
Along with the baseline regressions, this paper also provides more parsimonious
specifications. The simplification criterion consists of removing one by one the nonsignificant variables in the general model, preserving the horse-race nature of the
regression in the general model. Alternative specifications are useful to examine the
results in the general model after increasing the sample size and thus the degrees of
freedom. Given the asymmetrical availability of data for each key variable, the specific
model may relax the limits imposed on the maximum number of observations used in a
common sample.
2.3.1 Econometric results
Table 2.4 reports the main results using the entire sample of Latin American countries.
OLS regressions (columns (1) and (2)) do not display a clear winning regime in the
“horse-race” approach. The convergence term estimate is significant and has the expected
negative sign. However, the baseline GMM regression (column (3)), dealing with
potential problems of endogeneity, shows that NET_EXPORT is the only variable with a
statistically significant long run effect on growth .The convergence term in the baseline
GMM is still negative and significant.
significant:

a

positive

estimate

for

Some other individual coefficients are also

TRADABLEt , a positive estimate for

MANUF _ EXPORTt −1 and a negative estimate for MANUF _ EXPORTt −2 .The specific
4

If both lagged and contemporaneous growth rates are assumed to be the same in steady
state, the long run effect of any regressor is equal to its short run estimate divided by one
minus the estimate associated with the lagged dependent variable.
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GMM regression (column (4)), result of eliminating one by one the variables whose
estimates were not individually significant, confirms the results in the baseline GMM.
The number of observations in this specific GMM regression is substantially higher than
in the baseline GMM regression. NET_EXPORT is again the only regime with a positive
and significant estimate of the effect on growth. Certainly, the long run effect of
NET_EXPORT is slightly smaller than in the baseline GMM, however, Wald Statistics
show that the long run coefficient of the effect of NET_EXPORT on growth, obtained in
the specific GMM, is significant at a lower p-value. For the entire sample, LA-33, a one
standard deviation variation in NET _ EXPORTt −1 boosts economic growth by 0.37
standard deviations. This is approximately 1.18 percentage points of growth, a very
important magnitude given that the mean of GRGDPCH in LA-33 is 1.98 percent.
In columns (5)-(10), the analysis focuses on LA-15. As mentioned before, these
countries are the largest economies in Latin America and represent 98 percent of the total
Latin American GDP. Both, OLS and GMM regressions validate the robustness of the
coefficients for the NET_EXPORT regime. Interestingly, the long run coefficient for the
NET_EXPORT regime is very similar across different specifications, ranging between
0.19 and of 0.20. Also interesting in terms of the specification is the fact that the GMM
specific regression (column (8)), which was the result of removing the non-significant
variables following the general to specific estimation, includes exactly the same variables
whose estimates were significant in column (7). Furthermore, in comparison to the
estimates obtained in columns (7)-(9), the estimates in column (10) show that none of the
other regimes affect the inference on the role of the net export led-growth path. The
robustness of the results holds if the standardized coefficients for the regressions for LA-
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33 and LA-15 are compared. For the 15 largest Latin American economies, LA-15, a one
standard deviation variation in

NET _ EXPORTt −1 boosts economic growth by 0.39

standard deviations (1.13 percentage points). The similarity in the effect for the samples
LA-33 and LA-15 occurs because the difference in the long run estimates in column (4)
and (10) is offset by a lower standard deviation of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 in LA-15. The

standard deviation in LA-33 (9.64) is 1.7 times the standard deviation in LA-15 (5.80).
Although the GMM regressions use instruments whose validity cannot be rejected
by the Sargan test, it is also worth noting that that if there were any feedback from
GRGDPCH toward NET_EXPORT, a negative feedback is more likely than a positive
feedback. Higher economic growth usually results in an expansion of imports that
reduces current account surpluses. If this is the case, any bias in the estimate would
confirm rather than reject the positive effect of NET_EXPORT on GRGDPCH.
Additional descriptive statistics also point out in the direction of causality running from

NET _ EXPORTt −1 towards GRGDPCH. Data display a positive correlation between

NET _ EXPORTt −1 and GRGDPCH, while the correlation between NET _ EXPORTt −1
and lagged per capita growth rates is absent.
The estimates are also robust to different temporal subsamples (Table 2.5). This
paper divides the time frame in three periods, the first one from 1953 to 1994, the second
from 1989 to 2009, and finally, from 1953 to 2003, which excludes the most recent years
previous to the global economic crisis and the boom of commodity prices. The
overlapping is not ideal but given the small sample size the division tries to balance the
number of observations for each group of regressions in the first two subsamples.

25

Furthermore, the subsample 1989-2009 can be considered as the post 80’s crisis period,
marked by trade liberalization, and orthodox fiscal and monetary policies oriented
towards macroeconomic stability. The most drastic changes in the magnitude of the long
run coefficients of NET_EXPORT are reported in columns (2) and (3). For the period
1989-2009, the coefficient is 0.30 (1.5 times higher than the estimate for the complete
time frame), and for the period 1953 to 2003, the long run estimate is lower (0.12). These
regressions confirm the expectations in the sense that the net export led-growth regime
has been relatively more important during the recent commodity price boom.
Since the results suggest an augmented effect of NET_EXPORT in Latin America
during the commodity prices booms, and given that these commodities are mostly
primary goods, this study explores if countries that are more dependent on primary
exports also depend more on the net export-led growth regime. This study divides the
LA-33 sample in two groups: primary commodity exporters and non-primary commodity
exporters. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.6 present the estimates for the effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 on economic growth. Confirming the expectations, the long run
estimate for primary commodity exporters is substantially higher. The net export ledgrowth regime seems to have a more important role in this group of Latin American
countries than in non-primary commodity exporters. In both cases, however, the
individual and long run estimates of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 are positive and statistically

significant. As an additional test, it is included in columns (3) and (4) the proxy for the
competing tradable-led growth regime. Interestingly, the estimate for

TRADABLEt is

positively significant for non-primary commodity exporters in the long run. Furthermore,
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standardized coefficients of the independent effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 and

TRADABLEt are approximately the same. A one standard deviation variation in each of
these variables expands growth in 0.22 standard deviations (0.65 percentage points). It is
clear from these regressions, that on average, the role of the net export-led growth regime
is relatively more important in primary commodity exporters. However, its impact on
growth is still important in non-primary commodity exporters.
Although the main interest is in identifying the most robust growth regime,
export-led or tradable-led growth, in order to explore post-crisis prospects for Latin
America, this study provies regressions that include some potential omitted variables:
government spending as a share of GDP, saving as a proportion of GDP, a proxy for
openness, terms of trade, and world growth. Only two estimates for the control variables
appear as positively significant: SAV_GDP and WORLD_GR (Table 2.7). The regression
controlling for SAV_GDP is the only case in which the coefficient for

NET _ EXPORTt −1

is slightly lower in comparison to the baseline regressions. Although the long run
estimate of the effect of WORLD_GR is positive and statistically significant, controlling
for world growth does not affect the inference on the estimate for the effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 on growth. Estimates for the long run effect of (i) government
spending as a proportion of GDP, and (ii) terms of trade are negative and statistically
significant. While the inclusion of GG does not undermine either the significance or the
size of the effect of the NET_EXPORT regime, the inclusion of TOT boosts the size of
the long run estimate of NET_EXPORT from 0.20 to 0.52. This result suggests a positive
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correlation between terms of trade and the current account surplus in the LA-15 sample,
which lowers the coefficient on the latter when regressions exclude the former variable.
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 2.7 present the results of the regressions with time
dummies for the most serious downturns in Latin American growth (1984 and 1990). 5
Indeed, the time dummies capture the economic downturns in those years, and the
estimates, once again, are robust.
Finally, it might be a concern that the robust estimates result from outliers.
Although it has been dealt with this issue with the different subsamples (temporal and
cross sectional) to some extent, Table 2.8 provides GMM regressions for LA-15 that limit
the dispersion of both GRGDPCH and

NET _ EXPORTt −1 . First, the sample is limited to

the mean of each variable plus/minus two standard deviations (column (1)), and then to
the mean plus/minus 1.5 standard deviations (column (2)). These samples, therefore,
exclude severe economic downturns and expansions, and high current account surpluses
and deficits. The estimates are robust to these restrictions. Although the long run estimate
of the effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 is reduced when the sample is limited to the mean of

the key variables plus/minus 1.5 standard deviations, the positive and significant effect of
the net export-led growth regime holds.
2. 4 The investment rate as a mechanism
The empirical analysis finds that

NET _ EXPORTt −1 is a robust growth

determinant in Latin America. However, the effect of the current account on growth may
not only be direct, in the sense that a greater gap between exports and imports represents
an expanded demand for domestic output, but also that the effect may be indirect, if
5

Time fixed effects are excluded for obvious reasons.
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investment demand is the mediating channel. Thus, it is explored, in this section, if the
investment-mechanism is a relevant aspect of the net export-led growth path followed in
Latin America.
Investment becomes an obvious candidate for a mechanism since it is well known
in the economic growth literature, that an implication of some endogenous growth
models, in particular those that belong to the AK family of models, is that capital
accumulation is positively correlated with long run growth rates. 6 The validity of that
prediction has been empirically evaluated in several papers. For example, Bond et al.
(2010), a comprehensive contribution, finds evidence supporting a positive relationship
between the investment share (of GDP) and the long run growth rate of GDP per worker
in a sample of 75 countries in the period 1960-2000. A sub-sample analysis in Bond et al.
(2010) indicates, however, that their result is only robust for non-OECD countries. This
nuance, that may suggest that the prediction regarding the role of capital accumulation on
economic growth is conditional to the stage of economic development, may also be an
important aspect for Latin American economies which seem to resemble the features of
capital (not labor) constrained economies.
The attempt to identify the role of investment in the net export-led growth path
consists of two steps. First, this paper tests if gross fixed capital formation as a proportion
of GDP (GFCF_PROP_GDP) is a correlate of economic growth in Latin America.
Second, this paper includes the proxy for net export led growth along with
GFCF_PROP_GDP on the right hand side of the growth regression. Indeed, the

6

This prediction goes in clear contradiction with exogenous growth models a la Solow,
in which only an exogenous technological shock can modify the long run steady state
growth rate.
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empirical analysis suggests that investment as a proportion of GDP is a robust
determinant of growth. Table 2.9 shows the GMM estimates of the effect of the
investment share on growth. As in the previous section, lags of the dependent variable
and the third lag of the investment share are used as instruments. Once again, the Sargan
test is used to test the validity of the instruments. Column (1) confirms the expectation
regarding the effect of the investment share on growth. The estimated long run effect
(0.24) indicates that a one standard deviation change in the gross fixed capital formation
as a proportion of GDP translates into a change in the growth rate equal to 0.34
percentage points. Column (2) reports the estimates for a more parsimonious
specification of the regression in column (1), after removing one by one those variables
whose coefficients were not significant. The estimates in column (2) are not substantially
different from those in column (1). Results for the inclusion of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 ,

presented in column (3), are interesting for two reasons. First, they indicate that the long
run effect of the investment share on growth is not severely affected by the inclusion of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 . The estimate of the long run effect of

GFCF _ PROP _ GDP on

growth only drops from 0.28 to 0.27. Second, the long run estimate for the coefficient
associated with

NET _ EXPORTt −1 falls by 45 percent, in comparison to the estimate in

Table 2.4 (Column (10), when the investment share appears as a regressor. The fact that
the effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 on growth in Table 2.4 is higher than the effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 controlling for investment suggests that the investment share explains
an important part of the effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 on growth. This finding suggests
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that part of the effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 on growth may occur through the investment

share. Expansions in the current account surpluses (or reductions of the current account
deficits) in t − 1 foster capital accumulation and thus economic growth. Certainly, there is
still a direct positive and statistically significant effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 on growth.

In Table 2.10 (Column (3)), the long run estimate for the effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 is

0.11. This effect may be capturing output expansions that are not necessarily induced by
capital accumulation but by medium run adjustments in capacity utilization when firms
face the additional net demand for domestic output. Clearly, the previous findings on the
growth effect

NET _ EXPORTt −1 are robust, and both the positive direct effect of

NET _ EXPORTt −1 on growth, and the positive effect of NET _ EXPORTt −1 through the
investment share lead to pessimistic implications for Latin America due to shrinkage of
global imbalances in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
The results in this section lead us to another question: Why would trade surpluses boost
investment? A first answer is straightforward: a greater net demand for domestic output
increases expected profits, which encourage some firms to increase the scale of
production in the long run. Firms, which lack excess capacity may respond to the new
profit incentives by expanding capacity through investment. However, more international
finance oriented may also be very important in Latin American economies. As mentioned
before, by macroeconomic accounting, the current account and the capital account are
two sides of the same coin. Thus, ceteris paribus, a positive current account reduces the
external debt stock. The reduction in the debt stock (or greater national collateral) may
lead to a reduction of the risk premium paid by investors in the domestic economy. This
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reduction in the risk premium decreases interest rates payments, which are clearly
associated with the investment costs. Therefore, capital accumulation and economic
growth are fostered. These mechanisms obviously operate in a context defined by a
particular set of assumptions. Thus, the next section presents a very simple formal model
that builds on this intuition.
2.4.1 A theoretical framework
As mentioned in section 2.2, empirical results supporting a positive relationship
between current account surpluses and growth contradict the standard neoclassical model
of saving and investment with perfect capital mobility. The nature of the funds (domestic
or external) financing investment is irrelevant in that basic framework because an excess
of domestic savings would substitute for capital inflows (and vice versa). In a capital
constrained economy, the model may even predict, again in contrast to the empirical
evidence, that net capital inflows should be positive correlated with economic growth.
An opposite view, also discussed in section 2.2, is that domestic and external funds are
better understood as complements rather than as substitutes in the process of capital
accumulation (Aghion et al. (2006)). In other words, domestic savings may matter in
economic growth terms since they attract foreign direct investment. This explanation,
however, does not necessarily predict a positive relationship between the current account
and growth.
In this section, this paper attempts to describe a possibility that has not been explored in
former contributions. Current account shocks, sometimes absorbed by savings, may
reduce the risk premium paid by investors and thus the cost of investing. This
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mechanism, which leads to capital accumulation and economic growth, does predict
hence a positive relationship between the current account and growth.
The formalization starts with a set of equations describing capital accumulation in
a small domestic economy.
Imagine a capital constrained economy whose aggregate production function is
described by the Leontief/ fixed coefficients specification in equation (1).

Y =σK

(1)

where Y is the level of output, K is capital, and
marginal and average product of capital. Parameter

σ represents both the constant

σ is also the inverse of the capital-

output ratio. Given this production function, the output growth rate is described by
equation (2).
Yˆ = Kˆ

(2)
Equation (3) describes the capital accumulation of capital, which is equal to the

level of investment minus depreciation. This description makes the standard assumption
that capital depreciates at a constant rate δ .
K = I − δ K

(3)

After dividing Equation (3) by K , and using equation (2), it is obtained a capital
accumulation equation in terms of the capital growth rate, and the investment share I :
Y

ˆ Kˆ= σ I − δ
Y=
Y

(4)

Equation (4) describes the positive relationship between the investment share and
economic growth discussed in the previous section.
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Before defining the saving and investment functions, it is made explicit the fact
that the international interest rate paid by investors ( ri ) is higher than the international
interest rate paid to savings ( rs ). These interest rates are binding in the domestic
economy. The spread ( R ≥ 0 ) reflects the risk premium in the domestic economy, which
is specified to be a function of the level of external debt as a proportion of the level of
output ( D ), and a variable ( α ) that captures, for example, transaction costs,
Y

intermediation profits in the financial system and default expectations that are
independent of the level of debt.

ri= rs + R
R = R(

(5)

D
,α )
Y

(6)

This section uses d = D to denote external debt as a proportion of output.
Y

Another assumption is that ∂R > 0 . At the national level, a greater level of debt as a
∂d

proportion of output means a higher probability of default that is taken into account in the
risk premium.
The level of external debt varies when the domestic economy requires external saving to
finance the gap between domestic investment and domestic savings. By macroeconomic
accounting, that gap, if positive, has to be exactly the same as the surplus in the capital
account which is the same as the current account deficit (ignoring official reserve
transactions). Equation (7) shows the dynamics for the stock of debt. A surplus in the
current account corresponds to CA > 0 .

34

D = −CA

(7)

Equations (8) and (9) are the investment and savings functions (as a proportion of
output) respectively:
I
= i = i (ri , θ ) = i (rs + R, θ )
Y

(8)

S
= s= s (rs , γ )
Y

As commonly assumed,

(9)

∂i
∂s
< 0 and
> 0 . Variables θ and γ represent
∂ri
∂rs

exogenous parameters that may represent shocks to the investment and saving functions.
Equation (10) describes the derivative of R respect to time.
∂R  ∂R
=
R
d+
α
∂d
∂α

(10)

 − YD
  ∂R
∂R  DY
R
=
 + ∂ α
∂d  Y 2
α

∂R  D
ˆ  ∂R α
R=
 − dY  +
∂d  Y
 ∂α
 ∂R
∂R  D
R=
− dYˆ  +
α

∂d  Y
∂
α


(11)

Substituing Equations (4) and (7) into (11), equation (12) is obtained.

∂R  CA
 ∂R
R =
−
− dKˆ  + α

∂d  Y
 ∂α

(12)

After using the definition for the current account in terms of saving and
investment, and the saving and investment functions (equations (8) and (9)), equation
(13) is obtained.
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∂R
∂R
=
R
[i − s − d (σ i − δ )] + α
∂d
∂α
∂R
∂R
=
R
[ (1 − dσ )i − s + δ d ] + α
∂d
∂α
∂R
∂R
R=
[ (1 − dσ )i(rs + R,θ ) − s(rs , γ ) + δ d ] + α
∂d
∂α

(13)

Whether dσ < 1 , R* (level of R consistent with a constant risk premium) is stable

∂R
∂R

because =

∂R ∂i
(1 − σ d ) < 0 . The stability condition therefore depends on the debt∂d ∂R

capital ratio (σ d = D ) .
K

Imagine an exogenous shock to the current account captured fully by the saving
parameter (γ ) . This shock might be, for example, a positive terms of trade shock that
increases the retained profits of the firms, or even improves the fiscal accounts in the case
of governments administering an exportable good favored with a higher relative price (for
example, an oil price shock). 7 At the moment when the shock occurs, the economy faces
a reduction in the current account deficit (or an expansion in the current account
surplus). 8 Given that the greater level of domestic savings over investment has a negative

7

Indeed, data for Latin America display a positive correlation between terms of trade and
the current account as a proportion of GDP. However, even without terms of trade
shocks, a greater parameter γ may capture the idea that greater current account deficits in
advanced economies mean a less narrow margin for LA to run trade surpluses. Ceteris
paribus, parameter γ represents not only a positive exogenous shock on domestic saving
but also a positive exogenous shock on the current account. Therefore, shrinkage in
global imbalances might be examined in this model by the effect of a lower γ .
8
Empirically, the effect of the NET_EXPORT regime on growth seems to be more
important for negative values of NET_EXPORT than for positive values. These
regressions are not reported but are available on request.
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effect on debt accumulation, the risk premium starts falling. 9 A lower interest rate paid by
investors improves the viability of investment projects and fosters capital accumulation
and economic growth.
The stability condition guarantees that, once the adjustment is finished, the
economy remains in a new steady state where the risk premium level is lower than the
level before the shock. This stability condition only requires the assumption that the debtcapital ratio is less than 1 (σ d < 1) . This inequality refers to two effects of investment on
the risk premium. On the one hand, by accounting, a higher investment share has a
contemporaneous negative effect on the current account as a proportion of GDP. This
effect, hence, leads to a higher risk premium. On the other hand, although it might take
certain time, capital accumulation and growth fostered by investment reduces the debtoutput ratio and thus the risk premium. Thus, the stability condition limits the size of the
latter effect and excludes the possibility, for example, that a very small positive shock on
the current account may cause persistent reductions of the risk premium that
automatically would take the economy to a zero risk premium level.
The empirical evidence indicates that the prediction from this simple framework
is a plausible story in which the general results fit. Along with the findings on the role of
the NET_EXPORT regime and the investment share on growth, the data also display a
negative correlation between the current account as a proportion of GDP and the first
difference of the real lending interest rate (DLNER). The estimate for the effect of
NET_EXPORT on DLNER is not only negative but statistically significant and very
important in magnitude. A one standard deviation change in NET_EXPORT changes the
9

The negative effect on the risk premium might be re-enforced by a positive balance
sheet effect (or greater collateral) in the domestic firms.
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first difference of the real lending interest rate in -15.4 percentage points (around 95% of
the standard deviation of DLENR). However, after excluding some potential outliers and
limiting the sample to values of DLENR greater than -30 percent and lower than 30
percent, a one standard deviation change in NET_EXPORT changes the first difference of
the real lending interest rate in -5.9 percentage points (around 64% of the standard
deviation of DLENR), still a very important effect. This GMM regression must be seen as
a preliminary exploration of the relationship between NET_EXPORT and DLENR.
Although a complete estimation of the risk premium function would be ideal at this point,
that task is beyond the scope of the analysis in this paper.
2. 5 Concluding Remarks
The aftermath of the Great Recession presents two new challenges to developing
economies: shrinkage of global imbalances and a slowdown of the growth of imports in
advanced economies. These constraints are not necessarily binding for economic growth;
however, depending on the nature of the economic growth (tradable or export-led
growth) pursued by developing countries these economies might be more or less
vulnerable in the current world economy scenario. In the econometric analysis, robust
evidence is provided suggesting that the engine of economic growth in Latin America has
been based on a regime known in the literature as net export-led growth
(NET_EXPORT). This means that economic growth is boosted by positive changes in the
external balance on goods and services as a proportion of the GDP. This study provides
an econometric strategy and different statistical tests that cannot reject the hypotheses
that causality runs from the external balance on goods and services as a proportion of
GDP towards growth, and not the other way around. The estimates for the baseline
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regressions suggest that a one standard deviation variation in the current account as a
proportion of GDP boosts growth by 1.18 percentage points. This magnitude is
economically important, especially when compared to the mean of the per capita GDP
growth rates for the sample LA-33 (1.98 percent). Given the robustness of the estimates
regarding the role of the NET_EXPORT strategy in years preceding the global financial
crisis, Latin American growth is currently vulnerable to the shrinkage of global
imbalances.
After an examination of possible mechanisms, empirical evidence indicating that
the trade surplus certainly has a direct effect on growth is found; however, a relevant part
of the net export-led growth regime translates into growth through the effect on the
investment share. Using a simple theoretical model, some conjectures are made about the
link between the current account and the investment share in a capital constrained
economy (a plausible assumption for Latin American economies). The model pins down
the role of the current account in the dynamics of the risk premium paid by investors.
Positive shocks to the current account reduce the risk premium and thus the interest rates
paid by investors, resulting in a boost to investment. In a capital constrained economy,
higher investment translates into economic growth. Thus, the model finally predicts a
positive relationship between trade surpluses and economic growth.
Although different regressions for temporal and cross sectional subsamples lead
us to recognize the outstanding and ubiquitous importance of the net export-led growth
regime, in comparison to other interpretations of export-led growth and tradable-led
growth paths, the specifications also show that the group of primary commodity exporters
and the period of price commodity prices boom (2003-2009) experience larger effects of
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lagged net exports on growth. Interestingly also, the tradable-led growth strategy appears
as a relevant strategy in non-primary commodity exporters. In accordance to Rodrik
(2009), this aspect means that the implementation of second best policies as subsidies to
domestic production and domestic consumption could facilitate the continuation of the
tradable-led growth strategy in Latin American non-primary commodity exporters.
The next steps in the research will be in the direction of identifying the price and
quantity adjustments that, as a consequence of the trade deficit reductions in advanced
economies, occur in the markets for the most important Latin American exportable and
importable goods. That aspect might give us a better idea about the role of the terms of
trade influencing the current account. Since developing economies are not necessarily
condemned to continue the growth regime pursued in years preceding the Great
Recession, and the tradable-led growth regime seems to be the least vulnerable path in
coming years, it might be worth exploring the institutional and specific country
characteristics that may hinder the transition from an export-led growth regime to a
tradable-led growth path. The features of the current world economy make clear once
again that a process of industrialization accompanied by solid domestic markets might be
necessary in Latin America. However, that transformation may require an active set of
macroeconomic and industrial policies that have been out of bounds for discussion for a
long time in several Latin American economies.
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2. 6 Tables and figures chapter 2

Table 2.1: Growth regimes
Growth Regimes in Developing Economies

Tradable-led growth

TRADABLE

Export-led growth
driven by: manufactured exports
MANUF_EXPORT
current account surpluses
NET_EXPORT
exports to industrialized countries EXPORT_TO_INDUS
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Shrinking trade deficits
in advanced economies
necessarily bad

Shrinking demand
in advanced economies
necessarily bad

No

No

No
Yes
No

No
No
Yes

Table 2.2: Data and sample definitions
CODE
GRGDPCH
RGDPCH
TRADABLE
MANUF_EXPORT

NET EXPORT
EXPORT_TO_INDUS
GFCF_PROP_GDP
GG
LENR
OPENC
SAV_GDP
TOT
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

LATIN AMERICA (33 COUNTRIES)

LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES)

PRIMARY COMMODITY EXPORTERS

DEFINITION

SOURCE

Geometric growth rate of (chained) real GDP per capita
PWT 7.0
(Chained) real GDP per capita
PWT 7.0
Industry value added (% of GDP)
WDI
Manufactured exports (% of GDP). Calculation based on
Authors' calculations
manufactured exports (% of merchandise exports), merchandise exports
based on WDI
(current US$), and GDP (current US$)
External balance on goods and services (% of GDP)
WDI
Manufactured exports (SITC 5-8) to developed countries as a
UN COMTRADE
proportion of manufactured exports to World
WDI
Gross fixed capital formation as a proportion of GDP
Government spending as a share of GDP
WDI
WDI
Real lending interest rate. Calculation based on nominal lending interest
rates, and consumer prices inflation.
Opennes [(exports+imports)/GDP]
WDI
Saving as a proportion of GDP
WDI
Terms of trade
WDI
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
United States
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vicent and the
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador,
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Uruguay, El Salvador,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Panama
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Grenada,
Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Vicent and
the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela
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COVERAGE
1950-2009
1950-2009
1960-2009
1960-2009
1960-2009
1962-2009
1960-2009
1960-2009
1980-2009
1960-2009
1960-2009
1960-2009

Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
LA-33
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Deviation
Observations
LA-15
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Deviation
Observations

GRGDPCH

TRADABLE

MANUF_EXPORT

NET_EXPORT

EXPORT_TO_INDUS

1.98
2.07
10.49
-11.09
3.20
554

28.77
27.65
58.92
13.94
8.82
400

5.44
3.40
72.78
0.01
6.96
424

-5.66
-3.42
28.36
-47.67
10.27
484

45.91
43.53
98.66
1.51
25.49
400

2.09
2.29
10.49
-8.47
2.90
285

33.04
31.91
58.92
15.60
8.85
191

4.63
3.33
24.37
0.07
5.02
227

-0.46
-1.22
28.36
-19.86
6.23
248

41.39
41.19
94.48
1.51
22.96
216
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Table 2.4: Baseline growth regressions, 1953-2009
a

Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)
(1)
(2)
(3)
OLS
OLS
GMM
Baseline
Specific
Baseline
LA-33
LA-33
LA-33
Constant

46.6747*** 25.4342***
(4.13)
(3.94)

GRGDPCH t-1

0.3052***
(5.13)
-5.1735*** -2.7434*** -7.3106***
(-3.78)
(-3.64)
(-5.65)
0.0779
0.0996*
(0.88)
(1.72)
0.0447
-0.0576
(0.36)
(-0.85)
-0.1067
0.0462
(-1.47)
(0.74)
-0.0417
0.0285
(-0.44)
(0.42)
0.0266
0.1566*
(0.30)
(1.95)
0.0425
-0.1663***
(0.80)
(-2.86)
-0.0619*
-0.0293
(-1.90)
(-0.85)
0.0721
0.1204***
(1.54)
(2.83)
0.0262
0.0126
(0.50)
(0.29)
0.0062
-0.0308
(0.23)
(-1.25)
-0.0074
0.0254
(-0.20)
(0.84)
-0.0004
0.0036
(-0.0117)
(0.17)

Ln RGDPCH t-1
TRADABLE t
TRADABLE t-1
TRADABLE t-2
MANUF_EXPORT t
MANUF_EXPORT t-1
MANUF_EXPORT t-2
NET_EXPORT t
NET_EXPORT t-1
NET_EXPORT t-2
EXPORT_TO_INDUS t
EXPORT_TO_INDUS t-1
EXPORT_TO_INDUS t-2

(4)
GMM
Specific
LA-33

(5)
OLS
Baseline
LA-15

(6)
OLS
Specific
LA-15

(7)
GMM
Baseline
LA-15

(8)
GMM
Specific
LA-15

(9)
GMM
Specific
LA-15

(10)
GMM
Specific
LA-15

33.2758*** 36.9741***
(2.76)
(2.75)
0.2940***
(6.27)
-6.9554*** -3.5165**
(-6.28)
(-2.47)
0.1358
(1.47)
-0.0118
(-0.14)
-0.0872
(-1.02)
-0.2078*
(-1.72)
0.1661*** 0.2011
(2.74)
(1.60)
-0.1345**
0.0261
(-2.39)
(0.20)
-0.0613
(-1.15)
0.0867*** 0.1856***
(2.62)
(2.96)
0.0660
(1.24)
0.0071
(0.22)
0.0129
(0.18)
-0.0491
(-0.96)

-4.1250**
(-2.52)
0.0977***
(2.75)

-0.1776*
(-1.85)
0.2716***
(2.96)

0.2142***
(7.84)

-0.0566**
(-2.46)

0.1857***
(2.66)
-4.6269***
(-3.94)
0.2304***
(3.26)
-0.1443*
(-1.69)
-0.0122
(-0.17)
-0.2621**
(-2.60)
0.2697*
(1.86)
-0.0666
(-0.65)
-0.1210**
(-2.38)
0.2291***
(3.63)
0.0547
(0.79)
-0.0298
(-0.89)
0.0567
(1.47)
-0.0220
(-0.85)

0.2186*** 0.2051*** 0.2023***
(3.56)
(4.62)
(4.65)
-4.8897*** -5.5147*** -5.4427***
(-5.01)
(-4.94)
(-5.01)
0.2130***
(3.28)
-0.1927***
(-3.13)

-0.2324***
(-3.26)
0.1675**
(2.00)

-0.1557*** -0.0015
(-3.31)
(-0.0391)
0.3059*** 0.1578*** 0.1556***
(5.58)
(3.84)
(4.12)

Time Dummies
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Country Dummies
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Long-run coefficients (sum of the individual coefficients)
TRADABLE
0.0158
0.1269
0.0309 0.0977*** 0.0908
0.0260
Wald statistic
0.12
2.11
0.85
7.58
2.01
0.17
p-value
[0.73]
[0.15]
[0.36]
[0.01]
[0.16]
[0.68]
MANUF_EXPORT
0.0274
0.0270
0.0448
0.0194
0.0940
-0.0725
-0.0831
Wald statistic
0.12
0.15
0.85
0.05
1.77
0.54
1.47
p-value
[0.72]
[0.70]
[0.36]
[0.82]
[0.18]
[0.46]
[0.23]
NET_EXPORT
0.0365
0.1492* 0.1228*** 0.1902*** 0.2142*** 0.2000*** 0.1923*** 0.1966*** 0.1951***
Wald statistic
0.59
3.26
6.31
7.04
61.47
4.48
6.95
11.52
15.84
p-value
[0.44]
[0.07]
[0.01]
[0.01]
[0.00]
[0.03]
[0.01]
[0.00]
[0.00]
EXPORT_TO_INDUS
-0.0016
-0.0026
-0.0291 -0.0566*** 0.0060
Wald statistic
0.00
0.01
0.85
6.05
0.03
p-value
[0.95]
[0.94]
[0.36]
[0.01]
[0.87]
Adjusted R-squared
0.36
0.23
0.48
0.52
J-statistic
138.39
145.43
66.52
67.34
89.01
88.83
Instrument rank
150
153
94
94
103
103
Sargan test (p-value)
0.18
0.27
0.53
0.69
0.39
0.43
Cross-sections included
29
33
27
30
14
15
14
14
15
15
Observations
243
535
181
260
143
160
113
117
188
188
a
(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Long-run GMM estimates correspond to the sum of short-run coefficients divided by one minus the estimate for
GRGDPCHt-1 . Long run OLS estimates are simply the sum of the short-run coefficients.
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Table 2.5: Growth regressions for temporal subsamples
a

Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)
(1)
(2)
(3)
GMM
GMM
GMM
LA-15
LA-15
LA-15
1953-1994 1989-2009 1953-2003
GRGDPCH t-1
Ln RGDPCH t-1
NET_EXPORT t-1

0.1761** 0.1307** 0.2461***
(2.48)
(2.04)
(4.55)
-9.8367*** -7.3115*** -7.0844***
(-6.03)
(-3.94)
(-5.48)
0.1385*** 0.2581*** 0.0934**
(2.93)
(4.43)
(2.13)

Time Dummies
yes
yes
yes
Country Dummies
yes
yes
yes
Long-run coefficients (sum of the individual coefficients)
NET_EXPORT
0.1681*** 0.2969*** 0.1239**
Wald statistic
8.41
15.74
4.50
p-value
[0.00]
[0.00]
[0.03]
J-statistic
56.06
53.70
75.67
Instrument rank
63
58
87
Sargan test (p-value)
0.33
0.27
0.39
Cross-sections included
15
15
15
Observations
113
104
158
a
(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Long-run GMM
estimates correspond to the sum of short-run coefficients divided by
one minus the estimate for GRGDPCHt-1.
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Table 2.6: Growth regressions for primary and non-primary commodity
exporters
a

Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
GMM
GMM
GMM
GMM
Primary Non-Primary Primary Non-Primary
Exporters Exporters Exporters Exporters
GRGDPCH t-1
Ln RGDPCH t-1
NET_EXPORT t-1
TRADABLE t

0.3186*** 0.2300*** 0.3527*** 0.1455***
(7.56)
(4.89)
(8.29)
(2.98)
-6.5596*** -10.4499*** -5.9933*** -11.5931***
(-7.41)
(-8.20)
(-6.41)
(-9.55)
0.1165*** 0.0609* 0.1668*** 0.0599**
(2.95)
(1.70)
(5.02)
(2.04)
0.0230
0.0738**
(0.40)
(2.31)

Time Dummies
yes
yes
yes
yes
Country Dummies
yes
yes
yes
yes
Long-run coefficients (sum of the individual coefficients)
NET_EXPORT
0.1710*** 0.0790* 0.2577*** 0.0700**
Wald statistic
7.75
2.68
22.61
3.83
p-value
[0.00]
[0.10]
[0.00]
[0.05]
TRADABLE
0.0355
0.0864**
Wald statistic
0.16
4.93
p-value
[0.69]
[0.03]
J-statistic
79.77
81.46
74.50
66.81
Instrument rank
103
103
98
93
Sargan test (p-value)
0.70
0.65
0.68
0.77
Cross-sections included
17
16
16
14
Observations
187
163
143
122
a
(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Long-run GMM estimates
correspond to the sum of short-run coefficients divided by one minus the
estimate for GRGDPCHt-1.
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Table 2.7: Robustness to additional variables
a

Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)
(1)
(2)
(3)
GMM
GMM
GMM
LA-15
LA-15
LA-15
Z=GG
Z=SAV_GDP
Z=OPENC
GRGDPCH t-1
Ln RGDPCH t-1
NET_EXPORT t-1
Zt
Z t-1
Z t-2

0.1796***
(4.28)
-5.2678***
(-5.47)
0.1702***
(4.51)
-0.1380
(-1.64)
-0.0938
(-0.87)
-0.0207
(-0.29)

0.1939***
(4.05)
-5.9440***
(-5.24)
0.1258**
(2.25)
0.1178***
(3.54)
-0.0467
(-0.79)
0.0178
(0.45)

0.2159***
(4.90)
-5.9054***
(-4.94)
0.1527***
(3.84)
-0.0378**
(-2.20)
0.0885***
(3.65)
-0.0356**
(-2.23)

(4)
GMM
LA-15
Z= TOT

(5)
GMM
LA-15
Z=WORLD_GR

(6)
GMM
LA-15
Z=DUM_84

(7)
GMM
LA-15
Z=DUM_84_90

0.2064**
(2.38)
-8.9943***
(-4.20)
0.4110***
(5.65)
-0.0121
(-0.70)
-0.0485*
(-1.83)
0.0139
(0.97)

0.2356***
(6.54)
-1.2217*
(-1.68)
0.1590***
(3.37)
0.5939***
(4.57)
0.3926***
(2.67)
0.0325
(0.18)

0.2270***
(6.92)
-2.1072***
(-3.29)
0.1512***
(3.73)
-5.1259***
(-13.02)

0.2151***
(6.84)
-2.7329***
(-4.63)
0.1787***
(4.40)
-3.9551***
(-13.54)

no
no
Time Dummies
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
Country Dummies
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Long-run coefficients (sum of the individual coefficients)
NET_EXPORT
0.2074***
0.1947***
0.5179***
0.2080***
0.1956***
0.2276***
0.1561**
13.90
10.77
12.66
17.56
Wald statistic
20.35
4.46
19.28
[0.00]
[0.00]
[0.03]
[0.00]
[0.00]
[0.00]
p-value
[0.00]
-0.3077***
GG
Wald statistic
12.19
p-value
[0.00]
SAV_GDP
0.1103*
Wald statistic
2.78
[0.10]
p-value
OPENC
0.0193
Wald statistic
0.47
p-value
[0.49]
TOT
-0.0588*
3.15
Wald statistic
p-value
[0.08]
WORLD_GR
1.3331***
Wald statistic
21.86
p-value
[0.00]
J-statistic
80.98
87.42
84.33
45.54
94.07
96.01
95.86
103
103
Instrument rank
104
104
104
51
103
0.57
0.57
0.57
Sargan test (p-value)
0.60
0.41
0.50
0.22
Cross-sections included
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
188
188
Observations
183
188
188
85
188
a
(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Long-run GMM estimates correspond to the sum of short-run coefficients divided by one minus the
estimate for GRGDPCHt-1.
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Table 2.8: Robustness to limited dispersion in GRGDPCH and NET_EXPORT
a

Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)
(1)
(2)
GMM
GMM
LA-15
LA-15
(-4%<GRGDPCH<8%)
(-2.5%<GRGDPCH<6.5%)
(-12.1%<NET_EXPORT(-1)<11.1%) (-6.6%<NET_EXPORT(-1)<8.2%)
GRGDPCH t-1
Ln RGDPCH t-1
NET_EXPORT t-1

0.1690***
(3.14)
-3.4886***
(-3.68)
0.1719***
(3.81)

0.0742
(1.24)
-3.0964***
(-2.67)
0.1238**
(2.21)

Time Dummies
yes
yes
Country Dummies
yes
yes
Long-run coefficients (sum of the individual coefficients)
NET_EXPORT
0.2068***
0.1337**
Wald statistic
13.38
4.59
p-value
[0.00]
[0.03]
J-statistic
79.86
72.96
Instrument rank
101
89
Sargan test (p-value)
0.64
0.48
Cross-sections included
15
15
Observations
160
126
a
(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Long-run GMM estimates correspond to the sum of shortrun coefficients divided by one minus the estimate for GRGDPCHt-1.
In column (1), boundaries correspond to the mean of each variable +/- 2 standard deviations.
In column (2), boundaries correspond to the mean of each variable +/- 1.5 standard deviations.
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Table 2.9: Capital accumulation and growth
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)a
(1)
(2)
(3)
GMM
GMM
GMM
Baseline
Specific
Specific
LA-15
LA-15
LA-15
GRGDPCH t-1
Ln RGDPCH t-1
GFCF_PROP_GDP t
GFCF_PROP_GDP t-1
GFCF_PROP_GDP t-2
NET_EXPORT t-1

0.1614*** 0.1179*** 0.1315***
(3.34)
(2.59)
(2.78)
-6.0425*** -6.1132*** -6.3565***
(-4.92)
(-5.16)
(-5.18)
0.2750*** 0.2487*** 0.2355***
(6.40)
(5.88)
(5.04)
-0.1000*
(-1.67)
0.0239
(0.45)
0.0945**
(2.36)

Time Dummies
yes
yes
yes
Country Dummies
yes
yes
yes
Long-run coefficients (sum of the individual coefficients)
GFCF_PROP_GDP
0.2372*** 0.2819*** 0.2711***
Wald statistic
7.02
38.92
27.59
p-value
[0.01]
[0.00]
[0.00]
NET_EXPORT
0.1088**
Wald statistic
5.37
p-value
[0.02]
J-statistic
74.40
75.45
76.56
Instrument rank
103
103
104
Sargan test (p-value)
0.79
0.81
0.78
Cross-sections included
15
15
15
Observations
174
174
174
a
(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Long-run GMM
estimates correspond to the sum of short-run coefficients divided by one
minus the estimate for GRGDPCHt-1 .
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Figure 2.1: Global imbalances (current account balance as a percentage of
World GDP). Source: World Economic Outlook – IMF (October 2012)
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Figure 2.2: Imports by advanced economies (as a percentage of World GDP).
Source: World Economic Outlook – IMF (October 2012)
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Figure 2.3: Histograms of main variables of interest (LA-15, 1953-2009)
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CHAPTER 3
LATIN AMERICAN EXPORT STRUCTURE AND THE US GROWTH
SPILLOVER EFFECT IN THE GREAT RECESSION
3.1 Motivation and Background
The most recent recession in the United States following the financial crisis
was expected to have an immediate spillover effect on Latin American economies
given the importance of the US market for Latin America’s output. In fact, the
downturn 10 was rapidly reflected in the region’s average annual real GDP growth rate
in 2009 (-1.8 percent).

11

In comparison to other groups of developing countries,

selected by the World Development Indicators (WDI), only developing economies in
Europe and Central Asia witnessed a more severe GDP contraction in the same year (4.8 percent). 12 However, the distribution of annual growth rates in Latin America in
2009 was not uniform. While Mexico witnessed a severe GDP decline (-6 percent),
Colombia, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, and Panama, for example, displayed
positive annual growth rates ranging from 1.7 percent (Colombia) to 3.9 percent
(Panama). Given (i) the trade collapse in the last recession, (ii) the potential growth
spillover effect of the United States on the region, and (iii) the pervasive role of
external factors in the Latin American business cycles, this paper empirically
investigates if export-structure related factors that may historically explain a potential
output fluctuation co-movement between Latin America and the United States may

10

The US annual real GDP growth rate was -3.2 percent in 2009 (the deepest
contraction since the Great Depression). Data from the World Development Indicators
(WDI)
11
Data from the World Development Indicators (WDI)
12
In fact, the annual growth rates for developing economies in other regions were
positive: East Asia and Pacific (7.5 percent), Middle East and North Africa (3.4
percent), Sub-Saharan Africa (2.1 percent).
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also provide some preliminary insights on the uneven Latin American short-run
performance during the Great Recession.
The trade collapse and the vulnerability of the trade linkage between the US
and the Latin American economies were the main reason for the fears of a negative
performance in the region. Merchandise exports to the US in 2006, for example,
accounted for 38 percent of total Latin American exports. 13 In terms of GDP, the
importance of the US market is also noticeable. The average ratio of exports to US to
GDP for the region was 11 percent in 2006. Other potential threats, such as capital
outflows, which were propagation channels in past critical moments for the region,
were downgraded given the specific nature of this crisis, originated in the advanced
economies, not in the developing world, in contrast to other crises, for example,
during the Asian Crisis, or even during the Latin American debt crisis in the eighties.
Furthermore, global imbalances favored the financial security of the developing world
for several years preceding the crisis. In particular, Latin America had been running
current account surpluses before the crisis, and had favorable terms of trade since
2003, along with an outstanding accumulation of foreign assets, and fiscal and
monetary discipline. These were key elements supporting the financial stability in the
region. Economists have addressed the role of these aspects in cushioning the region
from a more severe financial shock despite the deterioration of the world economy
financial conditions. 14 However, for Ocampo (2009), who also acknowledges the
positive external balance sheets in Latin America, it is the trade channel, not the
13

Calculations were based on United Nations- COMTRADE data for the 15 largest
Latin American economies.
14
For example, Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2011) describe that during the 1990s and
the 2000s, Latin America adopted a set of macroeconomic policies (exchange-rate
floats and larger international reserves, among others) which reduced the vulnerability
of the region, in comparison to previous financial shocks.
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financial one, which seems to be the main mechanism transmitting the income shocks
in the North toward the South during the Great Recession. A comparison of the world
trade volumes in 2010 with those in the period 1986-2008 leads Ocampo (2011) to
suggest that international trade is the weakest link in the recovery after the crisis
among three channels through which the developing world was affected: (i)
remittances, (ii) the financial shock, and (iii) the trade shock. 15
Regarding the examination of a potential growth spillover effect from the US
on Latin America, this paper is motivated by the literature on business cycles comovement between countries. In general, empirical contributions on business cycles
co-movements have paid more attention to large samples of countries than to
particular regional analyses. 16 However, an increasing number of studies explore the
business cycles co-movements between the developing and the developed world.
These studies are usually framed in the context of the North-South coupling or
decoupling (Akin and Kose, 2008; Walti, 2011; Kose, Otrok, and Prasad, 2012). For
example, Akin and Kose (2008), which include Latin America in their sample of
Southern countries, find evidence suggesting that a medium-run growth spillover
effect of the Northern economic activity on the Emerging South has declined during a
period identified (by the authors) as the globalization period (1986-2005).
Nevertheless, the region Asia and Pacific seems to lead the general results. For their
sample of Latin American economies, while the effect from the North on aggregate
Latin American growth is positive and significant during the globalization period, and
15

Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) also observe that the collapse of the
international trade is a key aspect of the recent recession, and show that this collapse
is more serious than in previous US downturns.
16
Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003) argue that this fact is explained by the
convenience of having larger samples to obtain robust estimates in the econometric
analysis.
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it is negative and significant for the pre-globalization period, the effects from the
Emerging South are not statistically significant in any of the temporal subsamples.
For a different group of developing economies, Kim, Lee and Park (2011) suggest,
however, that the nature of the co-movement North-South is more complex. The
authors find, for example, that China and emerging East Asian countries are
increasingly more responsive to G7 shocks while G7 countries are more responsive to
shocks originated in China and East Asia as well. It is worth noting that contrary to
this case, the reverse causality is hardly an issue in the potential output fluctuations
co-movement between Latin America and the US since Latin American economies
resemble the assumptions of small economies in comparison to the US.
The focus in this paper on the United States, as an external-related source of
the Latin American output fluctuations, is also motivated by the literature that
highlights the role of external determinants of the Latin American business cycles
(Izquierdo, Romero, and Talvi, 2007; Osterholm and Zettelmeyer, 2008; Hernandez,
2013). Osterholm and Zettelmeyer (2008), for example, provide evidence supporting
the idea that the region is highly sensitive to external shocks. The study suggests that
from 50 to 60 percent of the variation in Latin American annual GDP growth is
accounted by external shocks. Furthermore, in the spirit of the specific relationship
between the United States and Latin America, Canova (2005) finds that the role of
domestic shocks in producing output fluctuations in Latin America is minor in
comparison to role of the US shocks. Moreover, the role of external shocks seems to
be common for the region. For instance, Aiolfi, Catao, and Timmermann (2011)
observe a noticeable commonality of cyclical fluctuations across Argentina, Brazil,
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Chile and Mexico, and highlight the importance of external global factors in
explaining the common regional cycle.
The trade collapse during the Great Recession and the potential growth
spillover effect on Latin America from the US, as part of the role of external-related
determinants of the Latin American output fluctuations, may be understood in a
common context, given the vast literature on the determinants of business cycles
synchronization (Kose and Yi, 2001; Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2003; Baxter and
Kouparitsas, 2005; Calderon, Chong, and Stein, 2006; Di Giovanni and Levchenko,
2010; Ng, 2010; Artis and Okubo, 2011; Jansen and Stokman, 2011). A long standing
result in this literature is the predominant role of trade. For example, Baxter and
Kouparitsas (2005) find that bilateral trade between countries is the only robust
determinant of business cycles co-movement; Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010)
claim that countries that trade more with each other display a higher business cycle
correlation; Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2010), studying the effects of the global financial
crisis on emerging economies, find a significant correlation between trade and GDP
growth rates between emerging Asian countries and OECD countries.
Given the importance of the trade channel in the literature on business cycle,
and the role of the US as the most important export market for the region (on
average), studies on Latin American economies must highlight the role of the United
States in the definition of North. This aspect is clear, for example, in some
contributions that focus on the Mexican case (Herrera, 2004; Miles and Vijverberg,
2011). Herrera (2004) finds, in fact, that Mexico and the United States share a
common trend and a common cycle according to a time series analysis for the period
1993-2001. More recently, Miles and Vijverberg (2011) provide evidence supporting
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Mexico’s business cycles synchronization with the US in the post- North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) years. However, the particular case of Mexico,
under this strong commercial integration, certainly may not be representative of the
general story for Latin America.
Finally, in spite of the acknowledged role of the US economy in the Latin American
output fluctuations, literature on the role of the trade structure in the synchronization
of the business cycles between Latin America and the US is not abundant. One
exception is the contribution by Torres and Vela (2003), who suggest that trade
integration, led by the manufacturing sector, is the main factor of convergence of the
Mexican and the US business cycles. Another exception, although pointing in a
different direction, is the work by Fiess (2007), a case study for Central America,
which suggests that trade intensity and intra-industry trade are weakly correlated with
the degree of business cycle synchronization. 17 Nevertheless, the evaluation of the
short-run effects of the Great Recession on the Latin American economies, using an
approach that builds on the literature on output fluctuations co-movement between
Latin America and the US, with special attention on the trade-related mechanisms is
missing in the literature. 18
This paper proceeds by exploring four aspects with an econometric panel data
analysis: (i) the correlation between Latin American and US output fluctuations, (ii)
the role of primary and non-primary commodity exports, and the role of the

17

This conclusion is, however, based on a simple correlation.
Levy (2011) offers a wide description of different aggregates associated with the
macroeconomic downturn (i.e. current account shocks, financial fragility, fiscal and
monetary domestic policies). Interestingly, for the particular purpose of this paper, the
report highlights the heterogeneity of the region’s countries in terms of export
markets destination. Nevertheless, the scope of this report is basically descriptive.
18
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dependence on the US export market, as amplifiers of a potential short-run growth
spillover effect, (iii) if what a country exports to the US at the sectoral level matters in
terms of the growth spillover effect, and finally (iv) if the observed Latin American
performance in 2009 resembles the implications of the statistical analysis based on
historical data. Following the literature on North-South decoupling, the analysis of the
business cycle co-movement between Latin America and the United States controls
for other geo-economic sources of output fluctuations. Although the US has been the
most important engine for the world economy after World War II, and historically the
most important trade partner for Latin American economies, the relative importance
of the US as a source of external demand for Latin American output varies across
countries, and may have certainly changed in time. The econometric specification
hence controls for the increasing relative influence of other developing economies,
China among them, as other potential gravity centers for Latin America. The next
two sections develop the empirical strategy, section 3.4 provides a simple description
to illustrate the econometric results in terms of the Latin American performance in
2009, and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and Econometric Strategy
The following baseline regression is used in order to examine the direct and
contemporaneous effect of US short-run output fluctuations on the dependent
variable: real GDP annual growth rate in Latin American economies (GRGDP):

GRGDPjt =α + φ GRGDPjt −1 + βUSAt + γ ADVt + δ CHNt + λ DEVt + f j + ε jt
The right hand side includes the lagged dependent variable (GRGDPjt −1 ) ,
controlling for persistence in the annual growth rates, and the key variable in this
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study: the US real GDP annual growth rate (USA). Moreover, Equation (1) includes
the real GDP annual growth rates of three groups of economies: (i) Other advanced
economies (ADV), (ii) China (CHN), and (iii) Developing economies, excluding
China and Latin America (DEV). As discussed in Section 3.1, it is important to notice
that this specification controls for the indirect effects of the US business cycles on
Latin America through other economies. The omission of these other potential geoeconomic sources of output fluctuations might lead to a biased estimate of the effect
of the US GDP growth rates ( β ) . For example, given the strong positive correlation
between US and other advanced economies’ GDP growth rates, 19 the omission of
ADV may cause an upward bias of the estimate of β if ADV and USA are positively
correlated with Latin America’s annual growth rates. Equation (1) also includes
country fixed effects ( f j ) and the error term (ε jt ) . Time fixed effects are obviously not
included in this specification since the growth rates of the potential geo-economic
sources are not different across Latin American economies.
The sample of Latin American economies includes 15 countries (LA-15):
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Uruguay, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Panama (ordered from largest to smallest size, according to the nominal GDP in US
dollars in 2006). The total GDP of these economies correspond to 98 percent of the
total Latin American GDP. Most of the excluded economies are Caribbean countries
whose weights in the total Latin American GDP are quite small. The dataset also
consists of a group of 20 Other Advanced Economies (or Non-USA advanced

19

The simple correlation of the annual GDP growth rates of the United States and
Other Advanced Economies is 0.69 for the period 1961-2012.
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economies) whose annual GDP growth rate is ADV in Equation (1). These economies
have been OECD members for more than forty years, and are part of the high-income
OECD countries group defined by the World Development Indicators. 20 In regard to
the Developing Economies (excluding China and Latin America), it is worth noticing
that these economies are a subset of countries from the Non-USA advanced
economies. The real GDP used in the calculation of DEV is simply the world’s real
GDP after subtracting (i) US’ real GDP, (ii) Other Advanced Economies’ real GDP,
(iii) Latin American real GDP, and (iv) China’s real GDP. The World Development
Indicators are the source for the economies’ real GDP used in this study.
In addition to LA-15, Equation (1) is estimated to explore the effect of the US
output fluctuations in two groups of subsamples: (i) “primary commodity” exporters
and “non-primary commodity” exporters, and (ii) “high export to the US” countries
and “low export to the US” countries. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the econometric
analysis attempts to examine the role of the Latin American export structure, and
specifically the role of exports oriented to the United States, as mechanisms of an
eventual synchronization between the US and the Latin American annual growth
rates. The definition of primary commodity exporters is based on the ratio of primary
exports to merchandise exports. Primary exports include the following categories: (i)
agricultural raw materials, (ii) food, (iii) fuel, and (iv) ores and metal exports. For
those Latin American countries classified as primary commodity exporters, the mean
ratio in the period 1960-2012 was above the median ratio for the entire group of 15
Latin American economies in the same period (75 percent). The information from
20

Since New Zealand’s GDP in constant 2005 US$ is not available from 1960 to
1976 in the World Development Indicators, this is the only country that was excluded
in the analysis despite New Zealand having been an OECD member since 1973, and it
is a high-income OECD economy according to the WDI.
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1960 to 2012 to calculate the annual growth rates for the different groups of countries,
and the ratio of primary exports to merchandise exports was obtained from the World
Development Indicators (WDI). For the second subsample, the definition of a “high”
or a “low export to the US” country is based on the ratio of exports to the US to GDP
(EXPUS_GDP). Countries classified as “high export to US” have a mean ratio of
exports to the US to GDP for the period 1960-2012 above the median for Latin
America (4.42 percent) The United Nations COMTRADE dataset is the source of the
information on exports from each Latin American economy to the US. Also in
relation to the dataset, the empirical examination uses the COMTRADE data at the
sectoral level, which reports exports to the United States for 9 different sectors
according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). Table 3.1
summarizes the data definitions of the key variables and the respective sources
Besides its representativity, the LA-15 sample displays a remarkable level of
heterogeneity regarding trade related aspects as export destination and the importance
of primary commodity exports. Table 3.2 provides a picture of the main export
markets of LA-15 in 2006. The economies were classified as primary or non-primary
commodity exporters according to the ratio of primary exports to merchandise
exports. In order to rank and list the most important export markets, Table 3.2 reports
the ratio of exports to trade partner as a proportion of total exports. Listed markets for
each LA-15 economy add up at least 50 percent of the total exports in the particular
Latin American economy. It is interesting to notice, for example, that only exports to
the United States from countries like Mexico, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and
Tobago, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Venezuela, account for more than 50 percent of
their individual total exports. Among these countries, while some of them (Ecuador,
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Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela) are primary commodity exporters, basically oil
exporters, others (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Mexico) export
manufacturing goods. On the other hand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay
display a relatively lower degree of market concentration, although the US is still a
main export market. Not surprisingly, some of the economies with more listed trade
partners (Argentina, Brazil, Chile), which add up to at least 50 percent of the total
exports, have China as the most important export destination in the group of
developing economies outside the region. Furthermore, Costa Rica and Peru, which
have the US as the most important export market, have China in the list of main
export markets as well. This composition of export markets highlighting the presence
of China is certainly a recent aspect for Latin American economies. Figure 1, which
displays the ratios of (i) Latin American exports to high-income economies to GDP
and (ii) Latin American exports to developing economies outside the region to GDP,
shows, for example, that in 1960, exports to high-income economies accounted for 11
percent of the Latin American GDP, while exports to developing economies outside
the region corresponded to 0.28 percent of the GDP. Figure 3.1 also shows that
although trade liberalization has contributed to the increase of total exports as a
proportion of GDP, exports to developing economies have been growing faster than
exports to high-income economies. In 2006, exports to high-income countries
accounted for 17.5 percent of LA’s GDP (1.6 times the ratio in 1960), while exports
to developing economies outside the region accounted for 2.4 percent of the Latin
American GDP (8.3 times the ratio in 1960). However, as mentioned before, the role
of the United States as an export destination of Latin American exports is still
pervasive.
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The coefficients in the baseline regression (equation (1)) are first estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and then by General Method of Moments (GMM)
estimators (Arellano-Bover and Arellano-Bond). The GMM estimators deal with a
potential non-orthogonality of the error term, especially, in this case, as a result of the
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (GRGDPjt −1 ) . It may be warranted here to
remember that it is reasonable to assume that reverse causality, as another potential
source of endogeneity, is not likely to be a serious problem in this specification. Since
Latin American countries are small economies in comparison to the US, Other
Advanced Economies, China, and Developing Economies (excluding China and Latin
America), the regressors USA, ADV, CHN, and DEV may be assumed as exogenous.
For example, while a growth spillover effect from the US on Latin America is
expected to occur, changes in the growth rates of a particular Latin American country
are not likely to affect the US growth rates.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 display the histograms of the annual growth rates for the
sample of 15 Latin American economies and the US annual growth rates for the
period 1961-2012 respectively. The average annual growth rate of the sample of Latin
American economies is 3.9 percent, and the standard deviation is 4.4 percentage
points. The distribution of Latin American countries’ growth rates ranges from a
minimum value of -13.4 percent (Panama, 1988) to a maximum value of 18.3 percent
(Venezuela, 2004). For the United States, the average growth rate is 3 percent with a
standard deviation of 2.2 percentage points. The distribution of US growth rates
shows a minimum value of -3.2 percent, not surprisingly for year 2009, and a
maximum value of 6.9 percent (1984). For both distributions, around 80 percent of
the total numbers of observations lie between the mean and the mean plus/minus 2
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standard deviations. Finally, in terms of this brief and preliminary examination of the
data, the simple correlation between the annual growth rates of Latin America and the
annual growth rates of: (i) United States (USA), (ii) Other Advanced Economies
(ADV), (iii) China (CHN), and (iv) Developing Economies, excluding China and
Latin America (DEV) seems to confirm the importance of controlling for other
potential sources of output fluctuations in the formal econometric analysis since
several of the annual growth rates of different groups of countries are strongly
correlated. The three most remarkable correlations are between (i) USA and ADV
(0.69), (ii) ADV and DEV (0.65), and (ii) the USA and DEV (0.47). It is worth noticing
that the statistical inference, in particular regarding the statistical significance test on
the estimates, may be affected as a result of these correlations among the right hand
side variables. However, this should be considered as strength in the econometric
results since estimates in the baseline regression are significant in spite of, not
because of, the variance inflation (greater standard errors) that is created in the
presence of muticollinearity.
3.3 Estimates
3.3.1 Baseline Regressions
Table 3.3 reports the results based on the baseline regression that estimates the
co-movement between the annual real GDP growth in the Latin American economies
and the annual real GDP growth in the United States, after controlling for other
potential geo-economic sources of output fluctuations. This table includes: OLS
estimates (Column (1)), and OLS estimates with country fixed effects (Column (2)).
Given that Latin American countries resemble the assumption of open small
economies in relation to the United States, and other large economies, the estimate
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associated with USA may be interpreted as the direct effect of US output fluctuations
on the Latin American growth rates. However, as mentioned in the last section,
GMM estimations are used to test the robustness of the OLS results and also to
control for the possibility of non-orthogonal error terms due to the inclusion of the
lagged dependent variable in the right hand side of the regression. Columns (3)-(5) in
Table 3.3 report the Arellano-Bover General Method of Moments (GMM) and
Arellano- Bond GMM estimates respectively, which use the lags of the right hand
side variables and higher order lags of the dependent variable to instrument the
contemporaneous growth rates and the lagged dependent variable GRGDPjt −1 .
In general, the outcomes from OLS estimations, with and without countryfixed effects (Columns (1) and (2)), are quite similar in magnitude and statistical
significance. Moreover, the estimates seem to be robust to the GMM estimation
(Columns (3) to (5)). Consistent with the expectation that was discussed in Section
3.1, the estimate for the direct effect of the US output fluctuations on Latin American
economies’ annual GDP growth rates is positive and statistically significant in the
GMM regressions, although it is not significant in the OLS regression with country
dummy variables. For USA, the statistically significant estimates range from 0.16
(OLS with country fixed effects) to 0.19 (Arellano-Bover GMM). For the ArellanoBond GMM estimate (0.17), the magnitude means that a one standard variation in the
annual GDP growth rates in USA translates into 0.08 standard deviations of the Latin
American growth rates. This effect corresponds to 0.4 percentage points of annual
growth, which is around 10 percent of the mean of GRGDP (3.9 percent). This effect
is noticeable since the baseline econometric specification is only focusing on external
geo-economic sources of output fluctuations. Estimates associated with DEV (other
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developing economies) are positive and statistically significant at the one percent
level in both OLS and GMM regressions. Furthermore, the effect associated with
DEV is relatively more important than the effect associated with USA. A one standard
variation of DEV would translate into a 0.6 percentage point variation in GRGDP
(0.14 standard deviations). In the case of Other Advanced Economies and China as
sources of Latin American output fluctuations, the estimates are positive but not
significant. These general results suggest that both USA and DEV have been direct
sources of the Latin American output fluctuations in the period 1961-2012, and
highlight the relative role of the rest of developing countries in comparison to the
United States.
3.3.2 Temporal Asymmetries and Export Structure
Examining the robustness of the estimates in temporal subsamples may
provide interesting clarifying details. For example, it is reasonable to expect that the
relative modest effect of USA in the time frame 1961-2012 is in part a response to a
recent decoupling between Latin American economies and the US, characterized by
the outstanding macroeconomic performance of China and other developing
economies in the last years. This hypothesis suggests that geo-economic sources of
Latin American output fluctuations may have changed over time due to the
appearance of new world demand engines. As a preliminary approach, two temporal
subsamples are considered to evaluate the baseline regression: (i) 1977-2012, and (ii)
1961-2000. The first time frame was determined according to the Chinese’s annual
growth rates time series, which display the beginning of an upward trend in growth
rates, and lower volatility since 1977. Furthermore, 1976 was the last year when
China witnessed a negative annual growth rate. Although the overlapping is not ideal,
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the time period 1961-2000 fulfill two requirements: (i) to exclude the commodity
price boom of the last decade that resulted in part from the emergence of the Chinese
economy as a new world economy engine, and (ii) to attempt to balance the number
of observations with the number of observations in the first temporal subsample given
the short time frame in the panel dataset.
The results provide in fact some additional details. Table 3.4 reports the
Arellano-Bond GMM estimates for the baseline regression for the two temporal
subsamples. The effect of USA is only statistically significant in the period 19612000. Indeed, in comparison to the estimate for the entire sample, the magnitude
increases from 0.17 to 0.28. In terms of standardized coefficients, a one standard
deviation variation of USA, in the period 1961-2000, translates now into 0.6
percentage points of growth, an effect that is 50 percent higher than the effect
estimated for the entire sample. For the same period (1961-2000), none of the other
groups of countries’ annual growth rates appear as positive and significant correlates
of the Latin American output fluctuations. This result confirms the non-challenged
role of the United States as an external source of output fluctuations in Latin America
before China and other developing economies had a more active role in the world
economy. Moreover, for DEV, the estimate is negative and significant in the period
1961-2000 (Column (2)).
Contrary to the results for the period 1961-2000, the estimates for 1977-2012
display China and other developing economies as winners of the horse-race regression
for the different external geo-economic sources of Latin American output
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fluctuations. 21 The estimate of the effect of USA is not significant, although close to
the ten percent significance threshold. For this more recent time frame, a one standard
variation of CHN translates into 0.4 percentage points of growth. It is worth noticing
that this magnitude is similar to the effect of USA on the annual growth rates in Latin
America in the entire time frame. Table 3.4 also shows that an increasing relative
importance of China is not the only remarkable aspect in the results for the period
1977-2012; the effect of DEV turns to be positive, significant, and important in
magnitude. A one standard deviation variation in DEV corresponds to 0.15 standard
deviations of the annual growth rates in Latin America. This change corresponds to
0.6 percentage points of annual growth, a magnitude comparable to the effect of USA
in the period 1961-2000. Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 display the estimates of the
effects of USA, ADV, CHN and DEV by using rolling window regressions for a
window size of 36 years. This window size is meant to be able to capture the sample
1977-2012. However, other window sizes were examined. Results were very similar.
The dynamic of these coefficients is consistent with the temporal sub-samples
analysis. More recent years certainly seem to be characterized by a stronger SouthSouth coupling while the influence of USA on the LA’s annual growth rates is
declining.
Estimates of the annual GDP growth rates correlations between the US and
Latin America may also be sensitive to different types of exporting structures in Latin
American countries regarding the role of primary commodity exports. For example,
since the income elasticity of demand for primary goods is usually lower than the
21

Since 1979 is known as the year in when China began its trade openness, the period
1979-2012 was also examined. The Arellano-Bond estimates of the effects of USA,
ADV, CHN and DEV are 0.15, -001, 020, and 0.33 respectively. The significance test
results are very similar to those for the period 1977-2012.
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income elasticity for industrial goods, short-run variations in income in a large
economy may affect relatively more the export demand in non-primary commodity
exporters. 22 Therefore, this mechanism may lead to a stronger synchronization of
annual growth rates between the large and the small economy if the small economy is
less dependent on primary commodities. Certainly, as described in the last section,
Latin American countries, in general, have historically been primary commodity
exporters. In fact, this aspect reflects the lack of industrialization, and the slow
structural transformation toward high-productivity sectors in the region. However, the
distribution of the ratio of primary exports to merchandise exports among Latin
American economies has a noticeable variance suggesting that the export structure
does vary among Latin American economies. The mean of the ratio primary exports
to merchandise exports for each country in the Latin American sample ranges from
0.45 (Dominican Republic) to 0.95 (Ecuador). Table 3.4, then, also reports the
Arellano-Bond estimates of the baseline regression for (i) primary commodity
exporters (Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, Peru, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago,
Colombia, and Argentina), and (ii) non primary commodity exporters (Guatemala,
Uruguay, Costa Rica, Brasil, El Salvador, Mexico, and Dominican Republic). As
expected, for the key variable, annual growth rates in non-primary commodity Latin
American exporters are more synchronized with the US annual growth rates. In fact,
while the estimate for the effect of USA is not significant in the sample of primary
commodity exporters, the estimate for non-primary commodity exporters (0.35) is
more than twice the estimate for the entire sample (0.17). A one standard deviation
22

This mechanism is certainly more complex and may involve, for example,
differences in the the price elasticity of supply. A formal theoretical framework is
beyond the scope of this study; however, a future work on this topic might be
interesting.
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variation of USA leads to a 0.19 standard deviations change in the non-primary Latin
American exporters’ annual growth rates. This change corresponds to 0.8 percentage
points. Since the standard deviation of annual growth rates in the entire sample and
the sample of non-primary commodity exporters is quite similar, the standardized
effect is twice the estimated effect for all the 15 countries as well. The only additional
regressor whose coefficient appears as positive and statistically significant is DEV.
Indeed, the estimate associated with DEV is significant in both subsamples; however,
the magnitude of the effect is greater in the case of primary commodity exporters. A
one standard deviation variation in DEV translates into 0.4 percentage points of
annual growth in non-primary commodity exporters, while the effect doubles in
primary commodity exporters.
In general the econometric analysis based on the temporal and export-structure
subsamples provide two main findings regarding the question on the co-movement of
short-run output fluctuations between the US and Latin America that were not explicit
in the baseline regression for the entire sample. First, the United States was relatively
a more important geo-economic source of Latin American output fluctuations in years
previous to 2000’s. Second, non-primary commodity Latin American exporters
display a more synchronized output fluctuations co-movement with the US.
3.3.3 Exporting to the US
While Section 3.3.2 dealt with the potential uneven effects of the US output
fluctuations on the Latin American annual growth rates, both in time and regarding
two different export structures, this section attempts to answer a straightforward
question that pins down the importance of exports to US in explaining previous
results: Do Latin American countries that export more to the United States exhibit a
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stronger co-movement of output fluctuations with the US? As mentioned in the
Section 3.1, a vast literature has identified the key role of bilateral trade as the main
mechanism that links output fluctuations in a pair of countries (or groups of
countries). However, in the context of a Center-Periphery relationship, where an
individual Latin American country (small economy) hardly affects the business cycles
in the United States (large economy), the role of bilateral trade as an amplifier of
output fluctuation may be simplified to the role of exporting to the large economy.
Economies that depend more on the US export market may be more sensitive to USoriginated income shocks. This question is tackled by three strategies. First, the
baseline regression is estimated for two new subsamples: (i) “high-export to US”
countries, and (ii) “low-export to US” countries. In order to define the subsamples,
the distribution of the ratio of exports to US to GDP (lagged two years) across Latin
America is used. The distribution of this ratio ranges from Argentina (0.9 percent) to
Trinidad Tobago (27 percent). The sample of “high-export to US” countries include
besides Trinidad and Tobago: Mexico (11 percent), Costa Rica (10.7 percent),
Dominican Republic (10.5 percent), Guatemala (5 percent), and two well-known
South-American oil exporters, Venezuela (11 percent) and Ecuador (7 percent).
The second strategy consists of including in the baseline regression an
interaction term between the US annual growth rates and the second order lag of the
ratio of exports to US to GDP: γ (USAt * EXPUS _ GDPjt − 2 ) . Therefore, the total effect
of USA now corresponds to β + γ * EXPUS _ GDPjt − 2 . This specification means that
the effect estimated in the original baseline regression may be amplified or dampened
by the ratio of exports to US to GDP. Although this specification makes explicit the
role of exporting to the US as a potential amplifier of the output fluctuations co72

movement between the US and the Latin American economies, the specification will
certainly be affected by the multicollinearity between USA and the new interaction
term. However, it is still possible to explore the robustness of the effect associated
with the US annual growth rates if at least one of the two terms suffering from the
potential variance inflation remains statistically significant.
Finally, the third strategy attempts to expand on the insights that the
interaction term may provide. This time, the interaction term uses sectoral level
information, following the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), to
identify if particular US-oriented exporting sectors have a relatively more important
role as a mechanism linking the annual growth rates between the US and Latin
America. The SITC classification consists of nine main sectors: Food and Live
Animals (SITC 0), Beverages and Tobacco (SITC 1), Crude Materials, Inedible,
Except Fuels (SITC 2), Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials (SITC 3),
Animal and Vegetable OILS, Fats, and Waxes (SITC 4), Chemicals and Related
Products (SITC 5), Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material (SITC 6),
Machinery and Transport Equipment (SITC 7), and Miscellaneous Manufactured
Articles (SITC 8). SITC 9 is a residual account for Commodities and Transactions not
Classified Elsewhere in the SITC. Therefore, for example, the interaction term

USAt * EXPUS _1_ GDPjt − 2 includes the ratio of exports of Beverages and Tobacco
to the US as a proportion of GDP rather than the ratio of total exports to US to GDP.
The

nine

sectoral

interaction

terms

are:

USAt * EXPUS _ 0 _ GDPjt − 2 ,

USAt * EXPUS _1_ GDPjt − 2 ,… USAt * EXPUS _ 8 _ GDPjt − 2 for each SITC sector
respectively.
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Regarding the first strategy, Table 3.5 reports the Arellano-Bond GMM
estimates for the two subsamples (“high-export to US” and “low-export to US”) and
their intersection with the entire time frame sample and the subsamples examined in
Section 3.3.2 (1961-2000, 1977-2012, primary commodity exporters, and nonprimary commodity exporters). It is worth noticing, in particular for the last
intersection, that “high-export to US” countries are mostly non-primary commodity
exporters, while low-US exports economies are usually primary commodity exporters.
For the effect of USA, results in Table 3.5 are not conclusive when the entire time
frame is used. However, the estimate is positive significant in three subsamples: (i)
low- export to US and the period 1961-2000 (Column (3)), (ii) high-export to US and
the period 1961-2000 (Column (8)), and (iii) high- export to US that are non-primary
commodity exporters (Column (10)). The magnitude of the estimates in the first two
cases are very similar to the results found for the temporal subsample 1961-2000
without the distinction of high or low exports to the US. However, the coefficient for
the third case is 0.45, higher in comparison to the coefficient in the column (4) of
Table 3.4 (0.35). A one standard deviation change in USA translates now into a one
percentage point of annual growth in Latin America (0.22 standard deviations of
GRGDP). In regard to the other groups of countries, the results are also consistent
with the findings in previous sections. However, the results make clear that the
estimate for CHN is positive and statistically significant in the period 1977-2012,
mostly for countries that are less dependent on the US as an export market in relation
to their GDP (Column (2)). In the case of DEV, the estimates also show a robust and
significant positive effect in the entire sample (Columns (1) and (6)), mostly
explained by the temporal subsample 1977-2012 (Columns (2) and (7)). Especially
74

for primary commodity exporters, with a high ratio of exports to US to GDP, the role
of DEV has been particularly important, although the coefficient for primary
commodity exporters with a low ratio of exports to US to GDP is close to be
significant at the 10 percent level (Column (4)).
Table 3.6 shows the estimates after implementing the second strategy
consisting of including the aggregate interaction term γ *USA * EXPUS _ GDPjt − 2 in
the baseline regression.

The estimates for USA are not statistically significant

probably due to multicollinearity; however, the interaction term is positive and
significant in two subsamples that had earlier reported a significant effect of USA: (i)
entire time frame, and (ii) non-primary commodity exporters. In terms of annual
growth rates, a one standard deviation variation in the interaction term corresponds to
0.6 and 0.9 percentage points of Latin America’s growth rates for the entire time
frame and for the group of non-primary commodity exporters respectively. This
effect, in comparison to the estimates of the coefficients associated with USA in the
original baseline regression (Table 3.3) certainly suggest an amplified effect in the
output fluctuations co-movement as a result of exporting to the United States. More
interestingly, the effect of the interaction term is also positive and significant for the
recent years (period 1977-2012). It is worth mentioning that this is a period for which
the estimates for USA had not been significant in previous results. A one standard
deviation variation in the interaction term translates into 0.6 percentage points of
Latin America’s annual rates of growth. The effects of CHN and DEV are robust and
consistent with previous estimations.
Finally, results for the third strategy, which examines the role of exporting to
the US at the sectoral level as an amplifier of the output synchronization between
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Latin America and the US, are reported in Table 3.7. The interaction terms for the
sectors SITC 1 (Column (2)), SITC 2 (Column (3)), and SITC 5 to 8 (Columns (6) to
(9)) are positive and statistically significant, indicating a possible amplifying effect
from these sectors (sector 5 to 8 have usually been associated with manufacturing).
However, Figure 3.8 provides a comparison of the effects of a one standard deviation
variation in these six sectoral interaction terms on the annual percentage growth rates
in Latin America. This figure, which also includes the effect of the aggregate
interaction term (including all the exports to the United States as a proportion of
GDP), makes clear that the most important amplifying effect is associated with the
sector SITC 6, which correspond to manufacturing exports to the United States
(Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material). The standardized coefficient,
associated with the sector SITC 6, is more than twice the coefficient associated with
the aggregate interaction term. This result clearly complements and confirms the
previous findings that highlighted the output fluctuations co-movement between the
US and Latin American non-primary commodity exporters.
3.4 Latin American performance in 2009
The econometric results based on historical data are consistent with the Latin
American uneven performance in 2009. Figure 3.9 shows the average annual GDP
growth rates for Latin America in 2009 23 for six groups of countries defined by the
export-structure indicators used in section 3.3. 24 The average annual growth rates
have been organized from the lowest (left) to the highest (right) in Figure 3.9. In fact,
23

The UN-COMTRADE dataset does not report Venezuelan exports to the United
States in 2007, and the World Development Indicators do not report the annual GDP
growth rate for Argentina in 2009. In order to preserve the comparability of the
groups, this last section only refers to the 13 remaining Latin American economies.
24
Categories were defined with the same ratios used in the econometric analysis
(ratios for year 2007 in this case)
76

consistent with the results in section 3.3, (i) non-primary commodity exporters, (ii)
countries more US market specialized, and (iii) countries where the manufacturing
exports destined to the US market are high as proportion of the GDP witnessed, on
average, lower annual GDP growth rates in 2009 than the alternative groups.
Likewise, Figures 3.10 to 3.12 show the scatter plots describing the simple correlation
between the annual growth rates in 2009 and those export-structure indicators in year
2007. These figures display (i) a positive correlation between the ratio of primary
commodity exports to merchandise exports in 2007 and the annual growth rates in
2009, (ii) a negative correlation between the ratio of exports to US to GDP in 2007
and the annual growth rates in 2009, and (iii) a negative correlation between the ratio
of manufacturing exports to the US to GDP in 2007 and the annual growth rates in
2009. Mexico and Costa Rica seem to be good examples of a perfect combination of
features leading to a strong transmission of the US shock in 2009, and hence a
negative annual growth rate: relatively low exports of primary goods, relatively high
exports oriented to the US, and relatively high manufacturing exports oriented to the
US. Although the annual growth rates for these two countries in 2009 diverge, there
are also quantitative differences regarding their export-structure indicators. For
example, while manufacturing exports to the US as a proportion of GDP is 1.7
percent for Mexico, the same ratio is 0.9 percent for Costa Rica. Among the countries
that faced less dramatic consequences of the US output shock in 2009, Colombia,
Uruguay, and Panama, for example, seem to follow the general implications from the
econometric results as well. These three countries are primary commodity exporters,
with a low ratio of total export to US to GDP, and a low ratio of manufacturing
exports to US to GDP.
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None of the countries with an annual growth rate below the Latin American
median (0.5 percent) faced the combination of at least two of the favorable exportrelated indicators in terms of the performance in 2009; however, Dominican Republic
is a case that clearly deviates from the general pattern. This is the only non-primary
commodity, US export market destined, with a high proportion of manufacturing
exports oriented to the US market that grew above the Latin American median. 25.
This country might be an interesting case study to examine, in future work, given its
relative resilience in 2009.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the literature in two main aspects. First, it identifies
and measures the business cycle synchronization between Latin America and the
United States. Second, it provides evidence suggesting that this synchronization may
be amplified by elements related to the Latin American exporting structure: (i)
primary vs. non-primary commodity exports, (ii) the importance of the United States
as an export market, and (iii) the role of manufacturing exports to the United States.
This approach is useful to have a better understanding of the uneven performance, in
terms of annual GDP growth rates, of Latin American economies during the Great
Recession in 2009.
The econometric evidence in this paper suggests the existence of an output
fluctuation co-movement between the United States and Latin America. The estimates
for the effect of a one standard deviation variation in the US’ annual GDP growth
rates on the annual GDP growth rates in Latin America range from 0.4 percentage

25

Dominican Republic had been growing at rates above the 8 percent from 2005 to
2007.
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points of annual growth, for the entire sample (LA-15) to a 1 percentage point, for a
subsample including countries that are non-primary commodity exporters with a high
ratio of exports oriented to the United States as a proportion of GDP. These
magnitudes are noticeable since the average Latin American annual growth rates, for
LA-15, and for non-primary commodity exporters with a high proportion of GDP
exported to the United States, are 3.9 percent and 3.2 percent respectively. These
results control for other external geo-economic sources of the Latin American
business cycle: Other Advanced Economies, China, and Other Developing
Economies. Interestingly, a temporal subsample analysis suggests a transition in the
main external source of Latin American output fluctuations from the United States
toward China and Other Developing Economies in the most recent years. However,
this evidence, supporting the idea of business cycle decoupling among South-North
economies, is attenuated when the regressions control for the role of exporting to the
US as a potential amplifier of the business cycle synchronization, through an
interaction term between annual US GDP growth rates and the ratio of exports to US
to GDP. In fact, the estimate associated with this interaction term, for the period
1977-2012, is positive and statistically significant while the effects from China and
Other Developing Economies are positive and statistically significant as well.
The particular co-movement between non-primary commodity Latin American
exporters and the United States, especially for “high-export to US” Latin American
countries, may be a consequence of mechanisms regarding the export demand for
Latin American output in the United States. In a basic Center-Periphery context,
where the US is a large economy while each individual Latin American economy is a
small one, US income shocks may unevenly translate into Latin American output
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shocks depending on the export structure. For example, if the income elasticity of US
demand is higher for non-primary goods than for primary ones (i.e. oil and minerals),
the external demand for the former is more sensitive to US income shocks than the
external demand for latter. In this case, non-primary commodity exporters would
witness a more severe shock during a US recession than primary commodity
exporters. However, another possibility is that given that the non-primary commodity
export supply is more elastic than the primary commodity one, non-primary
commodity exporters face a more rapid output adjustment as a consequence of the US
income shock. A theoretical model including these aspects, and certainly the indirect
effects of the price adjustments (i.e. effects on terms of trade) on the Latin American
output is a task for future research. Empirically, as a step forward to continue the
evaluation of this hypothesis, the interaction term between annual US GDP growth
rates and the ratio of exports to US to GDP was disaggregated into 9 sectors,
according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). Indeed the results
of implementing this econometric strategy suggest that Latin American economies
with a higher level of manufacturing exports as a proportion of the GDP display a
stronger co-movement with the United States.
Finally, as a very interesting preliminary result, the uneven distribution of
Latin American annual growth rates in 2009 resembles the findings based on
historical data. On average (i) non-primary commodity exporters, (ii) countries with a
higher ratio of exports to US to GDP, and (iii) countries with a higher ratio of
manufacturing exports to US to GDP, witnessed lower annual growth rates than the
alternative groups of economies.
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3.6 Tables and figures chapter 3

Table 3.1: Data and Sample definitions

CODE

DEFINITION

SOURCE

COVERAGE

GRGDP

Annual growth rate of real GDP

Authors' calculations based
on WDI

1961-2012

USA

Annual growth rate of United States' real GDP

Authors' calculations based
on WDI

1961-2012

ADV

Annual growth rate of 20 advanced economies' real GDP

Authors' calculations based
on WDI

1961-2012

CHN

Annual growth rate of China's real GDP

Authors' calculations based
on WDI

1961-2012

DEV

Annual growth rate of non-advanced economies' real GDP ( excluding Latin America and
China)

Authors' calculations based
on WDI

1961-2012

Total exports (SITC from 0 to 9) destined for the United States as a proportion of GDP

Authors' calculations based
on WDI (for GDP) and
UN-COMTRADE (for
sectorial exports to the US)

1960-2012

EXPUS_GDP

OTHER ADVANCED ECONOMIES (20 countries, excluding USA)

LATIN AMERICA (15 countries)
PRIMARY COMMODITY EXPORTERS

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
United Kingdom.
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Costa Rica, Uruguay, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Panama
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela
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Table 3.2: Main export markets for LA-15

LA-15 countries

Primary commodity
exporter

Argentina

yes

Brazil

no

Chile

yes

Colombia

yes

Costa Rica

no

Dominican Republic

no

Ecuador

yes

El Salvador

no

Guatemala

no

Mexico

no

Panama

yes

Peru

yes

Trinidad and Tobago

yes

Uruguay

no

Venezuela

yes

Exports to trade partner
as a proportion of total exports
(percentage points)
Summary statistics
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.
Mean
Median
St. dev.

0.6
0.04
1.8
0.5
0.03
1.5
0.6
0.005
1.9
0.6
0.007
3.2
0.8
0.01
3.9
0.8
0.007
6.1
0.7
0.007
4.6
0.9
0.008
5.3
0.8
0.02
3.4
0.5
0.001
6.0
0.9
0.07
2.7
0.6
0.008
2.1
0.8
0.009
5.3
0.6
0.03
1.9
1.0
0.008
5.3
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Main export markets
and exports to trade partner as a proportion of total exports
(percentage points)

Brazil
Chile
USA
USA
Argentina
China
USA
Japan
China
USA
Venezuela

17.7
9.6
9.0
17.6
8.6
6.1
15.4
11.0
8.9
40.8
11.5

China
Spain
Mexico
Netherlands
Germany
Mexico
Netherlands
Rep. of Korea
Italy

7.6
4.0
3.3
4.2
4.1
3.3
6.9
6.3
5.1

USA
China

42.4
7.7

USA

66.7

USA

53.7

USA

52.9

USA
El Salvador
Honduras
USA

31.4
15.3
9.7
84.8

Venezuela
Colombia
USA
USA
China
Chile
USA

19.7
16.0
8.8
21.9
11.5
7.2
58.1

Guatemala

5.5

Japan
Brazil

6.2
4.1

Brazil
USA
Argentina
USA

14.9
13.8
7.7
51.0

Russia
Chile
Germany

5.7
4.2
4.2

Chile
Japan
Italy

2.9
2.8
2.8

Table 3.3: Baseline regressions, 1961-2012
Dependent variable: GRGDP (Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita)a
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
OLS
OLS
GMM
GMM
GMM
Arellano-Bover Arellano-Bover
Arellano-Bond
with country dummies
with country dummies
LA-15
LA-15
LA-15
LA-15
LA-15
GRGDP t-1
USA t
ADV t
CHN t
DEV t
Sargan test (p-value)
AR(1) test
p-value
AR(2) test
p-value
Observations
a

0.353***
(7.88)
0.181*
(1.79)
0.048
(0.43)
0.012
(0.40)
0.357***
(3.45)

729

0.325***
(6.02)
0.176
(1.53)
0.058
(0.67)
0.013
(0.44)
0.356***
(4.84)

0.334***
(11.28)
0.163*
(1.76)
0.078
(0.62)
0.039
(1.28)
0.351***
(3.80)

0.323***
(10.56)
0.188**
(1.98)
0.038
(0.29)
0.035
(1.12)
0.354***
(3.75)

0.303***
(8.47)
0.167*
(1.71)
0.024
(0.17)
0.029
(0.90)
0.338***
(3.31)

729

0.01
-3.46
0.00
-1.31
0.19
729

0.04
-3.44
0.00
-1.35
0.18
729

0.05
-3.48
0.00
-1.34
0.18
684

(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 3.4: Regressions for temporal subsamples, and for primary vs. non-primary commodity exporters
Dependent variable: GRGDP (Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita)a
(1)
(2)
(3)
GMM
GMM
GMM
1977-2012
1961-2000
Primary
GRGDP t-1
USA t
ADV t
CHN t
DEV t
Sargan test (p-value)
AR(1) test
p-value
AR(2) test
p-value
Observations
a

(4)
GMM
Non-primary

0.347***
(8.86)
0.185
(1.54)
-0.032
(-0.20)
0.151**
(2.48)
0.350***
(3.41)

0.236***
(5.57)
0.283***
(2.65)
0.273
(1.39)
0.001
(0.04)
-0.360**
(-2.19)

0.299***
(5.95)
-0.004
(-0.02)
0.014
(0.07)
0.049
(1.02)
0.442***
(2.85)

0.283***
(5.71)
0.354***
(2.88)
0.024
(0.14)
0.009
(0.23)
0.230*
(1.80)

0.10
-3.33
0.00
-1.92
0.05
504

0.04
-3.44
0.00
-1.25
0.21
510

0.09
-2.66
0.00
-1.78
0.07
362

0.43
-2.26
0.02
0.67
0.51
322

(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Arellano-Bond GMM regressions. Variables
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Table 3.5: Regressions for “Low-export to US” and “High-export to US” countries
Dependent variable: GRGDP (Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita)a
(1)
(2)
(3)
GMM
GMM
GMM
Exports to US/GDP:
Low
Low
Low
1961-2012
1977-2012
1961-2000
GRGDP t-1
USA t
ADV t
CHN t
DEV t
Sargan test (p-value)
AR(1) test
p-value
AR(2) test
p-value
Observations
a

(4)
GMM
Low
Primary

(5)
GMM
Low
Non-primary

(6)
GMM
High
1961-2012

(7)
GMM
High
1977-2012

(8)
GMM
High
1961-2000

(9)
GMM
High
Primary

(10)
GMM
High
Non-primary

0.342***
(7.12)
0.159
(1.17)
-0.032
(-0.16)
0.089**
(2.00)
0.293**
(2.04)

0.350***
(6.51)
0.160
(0.93)
-0.088
(-0.37)
0.252***
(2.85)
0.311**
(2.09)

0.273***
(4.85)
0.289*
(1.87)
0.244
(0.86)
0.059
(1.23)
-0.442*
(-1.84)

0.290***
(4.51)
0.129
(0.68)
-0.161
(-0.58)
0.095
(1.52)
0.330
(1.64)

0.450***
(6.49)
0.181
(1.00)
0.182
(0.70)
0.078
(1.32)
0.215
(1.13)

0.219***
(4.21)
0.170
(1.24)
0.065
(0.33)
-0.039
(-0.87)
0.409***
(2.85)

0.327***
(5.58)
0.206
(1.24)
0.019
(0.09)
0.036
(0.43)
0.400***
(2.81)

0.133**
(2.17)
0.270*
(1.89)
0.278
(1.06)
-0.064
(-1.43)
-0.260
(-1.17)

0.301***
(3.74)
-0.214
(-0.92)
0.276
(0.81)
-0.023
(-0.30)
0.622**
(2.53)

0.097
(1.47)
0.448***
(2.80)
-0.045
(-0.20)
-0.041
(-0.78)
0.236
(1.42)

0.05
-2.63
0.01
-1.08
0.28
362

0.12
-2.49
0.01
-1.38
0.17
266

0.06
-2.60
0.01
-1.33
0.18
272

0.15
-2.07
0.04
-1.70
0.09
224

0.22
-1.69
0.09
1.33
0.18
138

0.36
-2.30
0.02
-1.12
0.26
322

0.36
-2.16
0.03
-1.48
0.14
238

0.37
-2.32
0.02
-0.90
0.37
238.00

0.43
-1.65
0.10
-0.84
0.40
138.00

0.2
-1.72
0.08
-1.44
0.15
184.00

(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Arellano-Bond GMM regressions.
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Table 3.6: Regressions including the interaction term USAt * EXPUS _ GDPjt − 2
Dependent variable: GRGDP (Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita)a
(1)
(2)
(3)
GMM
GMM
GMM
1961-2012
1977-2012
1961-2000
GRGDP t-1
USA t
ADV t
CHN t
DEV t
USA*EXPUS_GDP t-2
Sargan test (p-value)
AR(1) test
p-value
AR(2) test
p-value
Observations
a

(4)
GMM
Primary

(5)
GMM
Non-primary

0.318***
(8.46)
0.026
(0.23)
0.051
(0.34)
0.045
(1.11)
0.328***
(3.20)
1.807**
(2.35)

0.331***
(8.19)
0.038
(0.27)
-0.030
(-0.18)
0.148**
(2.38)
0.328***
(3.10)
2.115**
(2.07)

0.245***
(5.35)
0.192
(1.45)
0.247
(1.19)
-0.006
(-0.13)
-0.303*
(-1.83)
1.042
(1.19)

0.283***
(5.51)
-0.140
(-0.79)
-0.032
(-0.14)
0.087
(1.44)
0.445***
(2.85)
1.524
(1.53)

0.354***
(6.79)
0.164
(1.17)
0.078
(0.45)
0.004
(0.08)
0.162
(1.37)
3.986***
(3.17)

0.03
-3.27
0.00
-1.67
0.09
578

0.07
-3.15
0.00
-1.73
0.08
473

0.02
-3.29
0.00
-1.64
0.10
409

0.10
-2.56
0.01
-1.86
0.06
324

0.03
-2.20
0.03
0.65
0.51
254

(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Arellano-Bond GMM regressions.
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Table 3.7: Regressions including the sectoral interaction terms USAt * EXPUS _ GDPjt − 2 , 1961-2012
Dependent variable: GRGDP (Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita)a
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
GMM
GMM
GMM
GMM
GMM
GMM
GMM
GMM
GMM
Z= EXPUS_0_GDP EXPUS_1_GDP EXPUS_2_GDP EXPUS_3_GDP EXPUS_4_GDP EXPUS_5_GDP EXPUS_6_GDP EXPUS_7_GDP EXPUS_8_GDP
GRGDP t-1
USA t
ADV t
CHN t
DEV t
USA*Z t-2
Sargan test (p-value)
AR(1) test
p-value
AR(2) test
p-value
Observations
a

0.326***
(8.68)
0.094
(0.78)
0.047
(0.31)
0.038
(0.92)
0.357***
(3.47)
3.102
(1.10)

0.317***
(7.69)
-0.004
(-0.03)
0.098
(0.58)
0.115*
(1.93)
0.284***
(2.66)
125.049**
(2.13)

0.327***
(8.68)
0.026
(0.21)
0.071
(0.47)
0.046
(1.11)
0.329***
(3.20)
47.295**
(2.02)

0.308***
(7.40)
0.021
(0.17)
0.153
(0.91)
0.079
(1.48)
0.335***
(3.09)
0.495
(0.58)

0.163***
(3.54)
-0.103
(-0.69)
0.582***
(2.96)
0.145**
(2.39)
0.074
(0.58)
-395.438
(-0.67)

0.300***
(7.59)
0.080
(0.67)
0.046
(0.28)
0.069
(1.37)
0.274***
(2.58)
21.187***
(3.66)

0.297***
(7.83)
-0.092
(-0.78)
-0.032
(-0.21)
0.075*
(1.71)
0.307***
(3.00)
52.930***
(5.19)

0.319***
(7.85)
0.105
(0.85)
0.096
(0.57)
0.093*
(1.66)
0.261**
(2.38)
5.733*
(1.91)

0.344***
(8.54)
0.153
(1.28)
-0.008
(-0.05)
0.105*
(1.78)
0.312***
(2.94)
8.351*
(1.88)

0.03
-3.28
0.00
-1.58
0.12
574

0.04
-3.18
0.00
-1.44
0.15
464

0.02
-3.32
0.00
-1.68
0.09
559

0.06
-2.92
0.03
-1.59
0.11
448

0.02
-2.65
0.01
-0.92
0.36
354

0.08
-3.16
0.00
-1.48
0.14
507

0.03
-3.28
0.00
-1.88
0.06
542

0.07
-3.03
0.00
-1.32
0.19
475

0.06
-3.18
0.00
-1.71
0.09
489

(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Arellano-Bond GMM regressions.
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Figure 3.1: Latin American exports to High-Income Economies and Developing
Economies outside the region (as a proportion of GDP, percentage points), 19602011. WDI and author’s calculations.
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of the annual growth rates of GDP, LA-15, 1961-2012
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of the annual growth rates of US’GDP, 1961-2012
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Figure 3.4: Estimate of the effect of USA (Rolling window regression, 36 years)
on GRGDP. Lower/Upper defined by the 90 percent confidence interval. Year in
the x-axis is the maximum year in the window.
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Figure 3.5: Estimate of the effect of ADV (Rolling window regression, 36 years)
on GRGDP. Lower/Upper defined by the 90 percent confidence interval. Year in
the x-axis is the maximum year in the window.
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Figure 3.6: Estimate of the effect of CHN (Rolling window regression, 36 years)
on GRGDP. Lower/Upper defined by the 90 percent confidence interval. Year in
the x-axis is the maximum year in the window.
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Figure 3.7: Estimate of the effect of DEV (Rolling window regression, 36 years)
on GRGDP. Lower/Upper defined by the 90 percent confidence interval. Year in
the x-axis is the maximum year in the window.
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Figure 3.8: Effect of a one standard deviation variation in the interaction term

USAt * EXPUS _ GDPjt − 2

, for selected SITC sectors, on Latin American annual
growth rates (percentage points)
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Figure 3.9: Average annual growth rate in 2009 for selected groups of Latin
American economies (percentage points)
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Figure 3.10: Scatter plot of Primary commodity exports/merchandise exports
versus Annual growth rates in selected Latin American economies in 2009
(percentage points)
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Figure 3.11: Scatter plot of Manufacturing Exports (SITC- 6) as a proportion of
GDP vs. Annual growth rates in selected Latin American economies in 2009
(percentage points)

PAN
DOM

2

URU
COL
PER

ECU

0

GUA
BRA

CRI

-2

CHL

-4

SLV

-6

TTO

MEX

0

10

20
expus_gdp

growth_2009

30

40

Fitted values

Figure 3.12: Scatter plot of Total Exports to US as a proportion of GDP vs.
Annual growth rates in selected Latin American economies in 2009 (percentage
points
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CHAPTER 4
TERMS OF TRADE AND OUTPUT FLUCUATIONS IN COLOMBIA
4.1 Introduction
The role of short run output fluctuations in developing economies is
particularly important. Developing countries are usually more exposed than
developed economies to the effects of macroeconomic ups and downs. In addition,
welfare implications may be asymmetrical depending on the degree of development.
Some examples for a possible uneven effect are: first, that developing economies lack
the proper social safety nets to mitigate the impact of bad phases on the poorest
population; second, poverty and unemployment in developing countries make people
less capable of smoothing their consumption when temporary shocks appear; 26 and
third, the more variable tax base may constrain both the ability of the public sector to
implement long run projects necessary to remove the obstacles that hinder the
development of these economies as well as the responsiveness of short run fiscal
policy.
This study focuses on the terms of trade to explain these output fluctuations.
This decision is motivated by the literature on development macroeconomics based on
a small open economy framework (for example, Agénor and Montiel, 2008). In
particular, the dependent economy model and its three goods variant (exportable,
importable and nontradable) assumes that the small economy faces an infinitely
elastic global demand for its goods, and an infinitely elastic supply of imported
goods. 27 This means that prices of exports and imports are determined in the

26

Economic theory usually assumes that more volatile consumption decreases
individuals’ utility in the presence of risk aversion and incomplete financial markets.
27
For this study, the dependent economy with three goods seems to be a more
convenient framework than the Mundell-Fleming model, where the terms of trade,
when variable, are endogenous. The endogeneity in the Mundell-Fleming model
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international markets where the domestic economy has no market power. The
framework predicts that external shocks to terms of trade may be an important source
of output fluctuations in the domestic economy. An improvement in the terms of
trade, say, because of a boom in commodity prices, works as an incentive to expand
output in the sectors that face a higher price. However, the shock may result also in an
appreciation of the real exchange rate that increases real wages in the sectors that
produce importable goods. Therefore, the initial aggregate output increase might be
offset by the loss of competitiveness in the sector that produces importable goods
(Dutch Disease). The same mechanism may be easily extended to other exportable
goods. The net result, however, depends theoretically on critical assumptions
regarding the labour markets and the degree of price flexibility (market clearing
conditions). The most common assumption is that the nontradable sector clears due to
the variation of prices rather than by an adjustment in output. Furthermore, whether
these effects are displayed in the short run will depend not only on the type of market
adjustment but also on its speed, the reaction of the economic policy authorities to
changes in this relative price, the degree of openness, the degree of specialization in
exportable goods, and the exchange rate regime, among other elements.
Some facts justify the selection of Colombia as a study case. First, recent
Colombian exporting structure seems to support the role of exogenous terms of trade
as in the three goods model. Annual data for 2010 show that most of the Colombian

occurs because there is some degree of producer market power in the exportable
good. The price of the exportable good may be altered by internal conditions (that is,
domestic demand) even if the economy is a price taker regarding the importable
goods. Likewise, the two goods dependent economy model (traded and nontraded)
has its own limitation: both exportable and importable goods are aggregated in a
composite good (the traded good). Therefore, the variability of the terms of trade is
not defined and cannot be the origin of macroeconomic fluctuations. See (for
example, Greenwood, 1984; Buiter, 1988) for other dependent economy model
specifications.
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exports (62%) are concentrated in four commodities where Colombian market power
is negligible: petroleum and derivatives (42%), coal (14%), coffee (5%), and nickel
(1%). Second, quarterly information for the period 1994-2011 reports a positive
correlation between quarterly variations in terms of trade and quarterly growth of
GDP equal to 0.35. This magnitude is important relative to other studies for
developing economies (see section 4.2). Finally, the period 1994-2011 depicts high
variability in both the terms of trade and GDP. This variability is useful to test the
validity of the results from the time series analysis.
Although this work is limited to aggregate results, there are other channels that
can illustrate the relevance of terms of trade in the Colombian economic performance
in the short run. Let’s take again a commodity price boom as an example. Once the
commodity' prices rise, extra profits will be generated for the firms linked directly or
indirectly to the production of those commodities. Thus, this shock fosters the
expansion of consumption and output in other sectors. In addition, a higher level of
wealth allows investors to access financial credit more easily. This credit is available
due to the greater availability of foreign currency that relaxes the monetary
constraints. Therefore, the process boosts credit, investment, consumption, and also
profits for the financial system that nowadays accounts for around 18 per cent of total
Colombian value added. This mechanism is clearly plausible in Colombia where there
has been a large accumulation of international reserves, and where, despite the
Central Bank's inflation targeting policy, some interventions have been made to curb
the appreciation of the exchange rate.
Another reason for the procyclical terms of trade in Colombia may have its
origins in the public sector. Around 60 per cent of the total volume of exported oil is
exported by Ecopetrol (National Enterprise of Petroleum). Some of the revenues
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obtained by this institution make up part of the revenues of the nonfinancial Public
Sector. In addition, it is reasonable to expect that a commodity price boom, increasing
profits of the firms, and stimulating the economy, will also expand tax revenues. The
result is not necessarily a fiscal surplus. For instance, Kaminsky (2010) finds
evidence of a procyclical fiscal policy in middle income countries when terms of trade
shocks occur. 28
Regarding international trade, after the United States and the European
Community, Venezuela and Ecuador are the most important markets for Colombian
exports. These two countries are oil exporters and net buyers of Colombian
manufactures. This means that a commodity price boom that increases the income of
these commercial partners may also increase the demand for Colombian products.
However, preliminary evidence shows that the Colombian current account is not
positively correlated with the terms of trade. 29
This paper is a step forward in resolving the theoretically ambiguous
relationship between terms of trade and output. Specifically, this paper presents a time
series analysis that examines the relationship between quarterly growth of the GDP
and quarterly variations in terms of trade. For that purpose, a price index for the four
main exportable commodities is constructed, and this study uses a simple econometric
methodology (Box-Jenkins) that is consistent with: the exogeneity of the Colombian
terms of trade, the noncointegration between GDP and terms of trade, and the
stationarity of the key variables. The study offers different robustness tests, starting
with the inclusion of relevant control variables whose absence may cause a potential

28

See (for example, Tornell and Lane, 1999; Frankel, 2010) for institutional aspects
explaining procyclical public expenditure in developing economies. For Latin
America, see (for example, Medina, 2010).
29
See (for example, Obsfeld, 1982; Svensson and Razon, 1983; Kent and Cashin,
2003) for a discussion about the effects of the terms of trade on the current account.
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bias in the estimate for terms of trade. For example, real and nominal exchanges rates
are two of such control variables because a negative effect of the variations in the
terms of trade on short run output fluctuations could be associated with a Dutch
disease mechanism. Nevertheless, it is not clear a priori either that positive terms of
trade shocks result in an appreciation or that an appreciation is going to decrease
aggregate output unambiguously. First, nontraded goods production could increase
with the shock while the expansion of the real income would be adjusted by a change
of output rather than by a change of prices. Second, an eventual appreciation of the
nominal exchange rate, given a larger supply of foreign currency, could have
expansionary effects on output just as a nominal devaluation may have contractionary
effects. In a seminal theoretical model, Krugman and Taylor (1978) describe this
possibility. 30 Among different mechanisms presented by the authors, one of them,
following the Kaleckian tradition, states that an appreciation may redistribute income
from profits and rent to wages. The reduction in the price of imported inputs is
automatically translated into a reduction in the price of the home goods, which
increases real wages. Because the marginal propensity to consume is higher for
workers than for capitalists, the redistribution from wages to profits increases
aggregate demand and domestic output.

30

See (for example Lizondo and Montiel, 1989) for a deep overview of the theory on
contractionary effects of devaluation applied to developing countries. Razmi (2007)
extends the theoretical framework of Krugman and Taylor (1978). This extension,
including the role of transnational corporations and the type of commercial partners
for exports (developing or industrialized economy), suggests that the likelihood of
contractionary short-run effects of devaluation may be greater for developing
economies. As an opposite example, Reinhart and Reinhart (1991) finds that a
devaluation is expansionay in the short run in Colombia in a simulation based model
with a Neokeynesian structure.
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The empirical strategy in section 4.3 is thus essential to evaluate the direct
effect of changes in the terms of trade after taking into account eventual indirect
effects through other variables. Concluding remarks are presented in section 4.4.
4.2 Related Literature
Empirical evidence on the effects of the terms of trade on output fluctuations
in developing economies may be classified in three groups: (1) studies that describe a
correlation between business cycles and cycles in terms of trade as a stylized fact; (2)
simulation based models; and (3) vector autoregression models (VARs). Agénor et al.
(2000), an influential work in the first category of papers, find, for instance, a strong
positive correlation for Colombia, Korea and Mexico between the cyclical
components of the industrial output and the terms of trade (with both the Hodrick
Prescott and the Band-Pass methodologies using quarterly data). Also in this group of
papers, Parra (2008), with quarterly data from 1994 to 2007, reports a correlation
equal to 0.24 for Colombia, and Mahadeva and Gómez (2009), a positive correlation
between the terms of trade and real GDP per capita for Colombia equal to 0.32 (using
annual data for 1970-2007). 31 However, this type of stylized facts becomes more
persuasive when it is used either for the calibration of simulated based models or for
the specification of an econometric model.
For instance, Mendoza (1995), a seminal work in the second category, not
only reports a positive correlation between terms of trade and GDP but also claims
that his intertemporal model predicts that terms of trade shocks may explain from 37
to 56 per cent of the actual variability of GDP in developing countries. This outcome
depends of course on the particular setup of his three goods model (exportable,

31

See (for example, Rand and Tarp, 2002) for a description of stylized facts of the
business cycles in developing countries.
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importable, and nontraded goods). In that framework, the dominant effect that
explains the short run effect of the terms of trade on output is basically that terms of
trade gains induce an increase in the marginal profitability of the exportable sector
which fosters an investment boom in that sector. Investment corresponds to an
international and domestic reallocation of capital where the importable goods sector is
the only source of domestic capital (not the nontraded sector). On the other hand,
labour supply is inelastic in traded-sector industries, and the labour supply response in
the nontraded sector is assumed as negligible. After the short run impact, adjustment
mechanisms start to work to drive the economy to the long run equilibrium that is by
assumption equal to the initial equilibrium. The adjustment of the real exchange rate
toward its long run equilibrium reduces the short run interest rate differential, and
thus, the foreign capital that entered the domestic economy during the investment
boom goes out. As expected, the initial GDP boom weakens.
Although Mendoza's framework presents a plausible scenario for the positive
correlation between the terms of trade and GDP in the short run, different theoretical
assumptions could obviously tell a different story. Indeed, empirically, in his own
sample, some countries displayed a negative correlation: Egypt (-0.455), Philippines
(-0.285), Algeria (-0.234), Zaire (-0.107) and Tunisia (-0.309). These cases are not,
however, covered by the general equilibrium model in his paper.
Kose and Riezman (1999) and Kose (2002) are other examples of how conditioned
empirical evidence may be by the particular theoretical setup. Kose and Riezman
(1999), developing a general equilibrium model for a small open African economy
with two sectors (exportable primary goods and nontraded goods), finds that world
price shocks can explain around 45 per cent of output fluctuations, basically because
both the primary good and the nontraded sectors use imported capital goods as factors
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of production. Therefore, a decline in the international prices of imports leads to an
expansion of aggregate output. On the other hand, Kose (2002) finds that disturbances
in the prices of capital goods and intermediate goods may account for 87.6 per cent of
the output variability. The greater effect in this case occurs because the author focuses
on main exports and imports prices (which are more volatile than terms of trade in
relation to productivity shocks), and the role of intermediate inputs in the nontraded
sector, which, according to his open small economy model, does not face any limit on
the supply of capital.
The third group of studies have used VAR techniques to examine the effects
of terms of trade on output fluctuations in developing countries (for example,
Hoffmaister et al., 1998; Hoffmaister and Roldos, 2001; Ahmed, 2003; Broda, 2004;
Izquierdo 2007; Raddatz, 2007). These analyses are usually based on long run
theoretical models whose reduced forms become specific structural VARs. For
instance, Hoffmaister et al. (1998) make explicit that the terms of trade shocks act
through the price of intermediate inputs, assuming that a positive change in this price
behaves as negative technological progress. This way, positive terms of trade shocks
are positive supply shocks that relax the intermediate inputs constraint.
Regardless of the specifics of the technique, most of the literature suggests a
positive effect of terms of trade on output fluctuations in developing countries.
However, some of the documented literature undermines the role of international
prices. For example, Broda (2004) affirms that his evidence contradicts that from
Mendoza (1995). Broda, working with a sample of 75 developing countries with
annual data from 1973 to 1996, finds that the contribution of terms of trade shocks
accounts for less than 10 per cent of actual real GDP volatility in countries with
flexible exchange regime. Similarly, Ahmed (2003), that studied the economic
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fluctuations of six Latin American economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico and Venezuela), concludes that the terms of trade shocks might explain
(although not significantly in statistical terms) less than 8 per cent of domestic output
fluctuations.
The terms of trade have also been used as a control variable in explaining the
relationship between the short run fluctuations of GDP and other variables in Latin
American countries (for example, Barro, 1979; Edwards, 1983; Edwards, 1986).
Consistent with the studies described before, the effect is usually positive. However,
Edwards (1983) finds that the estimate of the effect of terms of trade on output is only
significant for Chile and Mexico, and not significant for Brazil, Colombia, and Peru.
Furthermore, Edwards (1986), who tests if a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate
may display contractionary effects in the short run, concludes that the terms of trade
effect on real output in developing countries is negligible.
To the author’s knowledge, no previous study quantifies the importance of the
terms of trade in explaining output fluctuations in the recent Colombian context
whose own specific features, and its status as a developing economy, may allow the
use of a simple but powerful econometric tool to pursue that quantification and to test
its robustness. Given that the background literature contains several cases of positive,
negative and null effects of the terms of trade, the question examined in the
Colombian case is fundamentally empirical.
4.3 Empirical strategy
This section aims to offer a parsimonious model for Colombia for the period
1994-2011 to describe its output fluctuations, to estimate the partial effect of the
terms of trade on GDP variations, and to test the significance of that estimate, using
quarterly data.
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This period of analysis was selected for several reasons. First, the data are
available without substantial methodological changes in the national accounts and the
balance of payments. 32 Second, the analysis excludes one of the most important
structural break points in the Colombian economic policy: the trade liberalization in
the early nineties. Third, the period includes: the commodities prices boom that
started in 2003, the subsequent downturn at the end of 2008 (for the Colombian terms
of trade), and a recovery starting in 2009. In the same way, this period also includes
the sharpest recession known in Colombian economic history (year 1999) and a
period of high growth (2003-2007) (figure 4.1).
Regarding the statistical procedure, this paper follows the Box-Jenkins
technique for a univariate model. The type of model that is estimated is usually
known in the literature as ARMAX, a model for stationary series with three
components: (1) the autoregressive part (AR), (2) the moving average part (MA), and
(3) the set of other explanatory variables (X). The general model is thus:
n

n

n

α + ∑ λ p yt − p + ∑ θ q µt − q + ∑ γ i ,m X i ,t − m + µt
yt =

(1)

=
p 1=
q 1=
m 0

Where y represents the dependent variable (a stationary series of the GDP in
this paper), t indexes time, µ is the error term, X is the set of explanatory variables
(stationary, and that includes the terms of trade), and:

α, λ,

θ , and γ , the

parameters to estimate.
There are several reasons that justify the specification in equation (1) given
that GDP and terms of trade are not cointegrated First, stationary series reduce the

32

Although the information was obtained directly from the National Department of
Statistics (Dane), the International Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset does not report
quarterly GDP data for Colombia in years before 1994.
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possibility of spurious correlations due to similar trends between the dependent and
an explanatory variable. Second, the Wold Decomposition shows that any stationary
process can be approached through the combination of both the autoregressive and the
moving average models. Third, the combination of both components contributes to
the parsimony of the model, once the autocorrelation of the errors that would affect
the significance tests is taken into account. Finally, the use of an ARMA model
allows one to control for any possible persistence of the output fluctuations. 33 In
addition to the estimation of the contemporaneous effect, this specification allows the
estimation of the total effect of terms of trade on GDP over time.
Besides the ARMA specification and the terms of trade, control variables must
be considered in the set of explanatory variables. The main reason is that their
omission may result in a biased estimate for the effect of terms of trade. From the
aggregate demand side, 34 robustness tests include two groups of monetary variables:
lending interest rates, and exchange rates.. Interest rates may be important in the
determination of the investment component, which explains most of the variability in
GDP, and may also be responsive to changes in the terms of trade through the
relaxation of balance of payment constraints. On the other hand, the inclusion of the
nominal and real exchange rates permits to test not only the robustness of the effect of
the terms of trade but also to examine if the short run effect of a depreciation (or an
appreciation) of the exchange rate is contractionary (or expansionary). Finally, the
quarterly growth of the United States GDP (GDPUS), and the net financial flows
(inflows minus outflows) in the Colombian balance of payments (NFF) will also be

33

See (for example, Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Campbell and Mankiw, 1987;
Blanchard and Quah, 1989) for the discussion about the persistence of the output
fluctuations.
34
See (for example, Shapiro and Watson, 1998) divides the source of output
fluctuations in demand and supply components.
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treated as control variables. Both variables might also be correlated simultaneously
with the terms of trade and Colombian GDP.
The specification leaves aside technological shocks, which are an important
element in the real business cycles literature. 35 There are some reasons that justify this
decision. First, given the volatility of the quarterly data, it is unlikely the existence of
technological shocks that are correlated with the terms of trade and that can explain
variations of GDP quarter to quarter (even if some amplifiers are considered). Second,
proxies of technical change, like total factor productivity, are not usually reliable,
especially in developing countries. Third, despite the fact that a clear identification is
impossible, the ARMA specification is already controlling for the new information
(innovations) through its moving average term, including non-observable shocks that
affect output. 36
Likewise, the study omits the role of the expectations of economic agents and
also the management of these expectations as an instrument of economic policy, for
example, through monetary policy. This is a limitation of the study despite the
difficulty of having a good proxy for that variable.

35

See (for example, Mankiw, 1989) for a criticism over the real business cycle theory
and (Holland and Scott, 1998) for an empirical defense of the technical change
explaining the business cycle in the United Kingdom.
36
As another supply side shock, although not correlated with the terms of trade, but
eventually helpful to understand the nature of the Colombian business cycle, the
climate phenomenon El Niño was revised in a previous analysis not reported in this
paper. Using the multivariate ENSO index (El Niño/Southern Oscillation
Phenomenon) (www.esrl.noaa.gov), different alternative definitions were considered
to create a dummy variable. For example: if the quarter was in the warm phase or not,
if the quarter was in a warm phase with an index that was one standard deviation
higher than the average or not, or if the absolute value of the index was relatively high
to its average. No clear relationship between El Niño and GDP for the period of
analysis was found.
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While further research can explore whether particular variables may improve
the fitness of the model, the main purpose of the study is not to obtain a forecasting
model, but to evaluate the role of the terms of trade.
4.3.1 Variables and Data Description
The quarterly data for real GDP, seasonally adjusted, was obtained from the
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (National Department of
Statistics in Colombia). The dependent variable is the first difference of the logarithm
of GDP (DLGDP) for Colombia, approximately quarterly growth of the GDP (figure
4.2). This transformation is necessary for two reasons: it defines the variable in terms
of output fluctuations, and it accomplishes the stationarity requirement in the BoxJenkins technique. According to different tests, weak stationarity of DLGDP is
verified by rejecting the null hypothesis that this series has a unit root.
As an alternative definition of output fluctuations, the cyclical component of
the GDP is estimated through the Hodrick-Prescott filter (GDPCYCLE). This series
is also stationary.
Two definitions for the terms of trade are used in this paper. The first was
constructed with statistical information from the balance of payments and the
wholesale imports price index from the Colombian Central Bank (Banco de la
República de Colombia). This definition, called TOTCL, corresponds to the ratio (
PXCL
), where the denominator is the wholesale imports price index and the
PI

numerator is a Laspeyres index 37 for the basket of the most important Colombian
exportable commodities (oil, coal, coffee and nickel). This study uses the variable
DLTOTCL (first difference of logarithm of TOTCL). The second definition is called

37

A Paasche index was also calculated but it did not exhibit a substantial difference
from the Laspeyres one.
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TOTT, available also from the Colombian Central Bank, which corresponds to the
ratio between the wholesale exports price index and the wholesale imports price index
( PX ). The transformed variable is called DLTOTT (first difference of logarithm of
PI

TOTT).
As a preliminary graphical diagnostic of the key relationship in this paper,
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 present the correlation between the output fluctuations and the
variations in the terms of trade in Colombia. Figure 4.3 depicts the simple correlation
(the correlation coefficient is 0.35). Figure 4.4 shows the correlation between the
cyclical components of GDP and TOTCL (the correlation coefficient is 0.48). Besides
the positive correlation, both scatter plots suggest that these correlation coefficients
are not augmented by potential outliers. Most of the observations in the sample follow
the same pattern described by the simple OLS regression between DLGDP and
DLTOTCL in figure 4.3, and between GDPCYCLE and TOTCLCYCLE in figure
4.4.
This empirical analysis assumes, based on the dependent economy framework,
and the construction of the series related to terms of trade, that the terms of trade are
exogenous and that they cause the output fluctuations, not the other way around.
Although this is a very plausible assumption for Colombia as described in the
introduction, a Granger causality test was performed. The test suggests the no
rejection of this assumption (table 4.1).
This diagnostic test also suggests that DLTOTCL does not Granger cause
DLGDP (although the p values are relatively smaller than those in the other
hypothesis in table 4.1). More formal empirical results on the relationship DLTOTCL
and DLGDP will be presented in the following section. In addition to the terms of
trade definitions above, four more related prices are used (as alternative to TOTCL) in
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the right hand side of the regressions: a Laspeyres index for the prices of oil, coal,
coffee and nickel (PXCL), the oil prices (OILPR), the wholesale imports price index
(PI), and the wholesale exports price index (PX). The transformed and stationary
variables are called DLPXCL, DLOILPR, DLPIIFS and DLPXIFS respectively.
Four stationary control variables are included in the right hand side of the
regression. The first is the first difference of the nominal lending interest rate (DNIR)
which was obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and corresponds to a
weighted average of effective rates for the whole banking system including all types
of credit. As an alternative, the first difference of the real interest rate was calculated
using the inflation in the producer price index (DRIR).
The second variable is DLNER, the nominal depreciation of the exchange rate
(the first difference of the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate). DLNER
corresponds to quarterly depreciation of the exchange rate when the value is positive.
Likewise, this study also uses the first difference of the logarithm of the real exchange
rate (DLRER).
The third variable is the first difference of the net financial flows (inflows
minus outflows in the Colombian balance of payments). Although interest rates and
exchanges rates should capture the role of financial flows to some extent, this variable
is included as a potential omitted variable.
Finally, the econometric analysis controls for the quarterly growth of United
States GDP (DLGDPUS). This series are available in the IFS. United States is the
destination for approximately 40 per cent of the total Colombian exports and 70 per
cent of the Colombian exported oil.
Control variables could be correlated among themselves, for instance, changes
in the structure of interest rates along with some degree of capital mobility may put
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pressure on the exchange rates and such correlation could affect the respective
significance tests. However, the key issue in this paper is a possible bias that may
exist if these control variables are omitted given their simultaneous correlation with
terms and trade and output fluctuations.
4.3.2 Econometric Results
The specification of the ARMA component of the model was based on the
correlogram for the dependent variable, and a set of regressions that evaluate the
significance of the estimated coefficients for the ARMA elements (DLGDP as the left
hand side variable). Both the autocorrelation and the partial correlation functions
suggest a specification around the ARMA (3, 3). However, the set of regressions
(even including a fourth lag with an eventual economic interpretation) permits to find
a robust and parsimonious specification. Therefore, this analysis uses a parsimonious
version of the ARMA (2, 3) without including the first lag for the autoregressive
component and without the first and second lags for the moving average. The
estimates in the ARMA (2, 3) are robust to the inclusion of the terms of trade and the
control variables. The number of lags is reasonable to interpret the effects on the
dependent variable in the short run. Given the quarterly data, the second lag in the
autoregressive component refers to a half year lag.
Table 4.2 (column 1) reports positive and significant estimates for the ARMA
coefficients. While the estimates for the moving average coefficient can be associated
with the effect of the statistical innovations, the estimate in the autoregressive part
suggests the existence of an important degree of persistence in the Colombian GDP
fluctuations. All the estimates for this ARMA model are significant at least at the 5
per cent level. The ARMA model can explain 17 per cent of the total variation in the
dependent variable. The Durbin h statistic, the p value of the Chi-Square test Breusch-
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Godfrey for the residual, and the correlogram of the residual suggest the absence of
autocorrelation. Furthermore, given the assumption of weak stationarity, DLGDP
does not face heteroskedasticity. This means that the t-statistics and the p-values used
to establish significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent are reliable.
Column 3 corresponds to the regression including DLTOTCL:

DLGDPt =
α + γ 1DLTOTCL + λ2 DLGDPt −2 + θ3 µt −3 + µt

(2)

The estimate for the effect of DLTOTCL on DLGDP is significantly positive
at the 1 per cent level. The magnitude of the estimate for the contemporaneous effect
means that a 1 per cent increase in the growth of the terms of trade increases by 0.02
per cent the quarterly growth of GDP (holding other variables constant). This
magnitude is important. One standard deviation in DLTOTCL (equal to 13.22 per
cent) will change the quarterly growth of GDP by 0.28 per cent. This change is
around 23 per cent of one standard deviation in the quarterly growth of GDP (column
4). Once the persistence effect is calculated, the same standard deviation of DTOTLC
is associated with a change around 34 per cent of one standard deviation in the
quarterly growth of the GDP. Therefore, one third of the quarterly variability in GDP
is driven by the terms of trade for the four most important Colombian commodities.
The terms of trade effect holds when the definition of the terms of trade is
extended to include the unit value of all the Colombian exports (DLTOTT) (column
1, table 4.3). The estimate is higher but the standard deviation of DLTOTT is lower
(5.79%). The regressor still explains around 27 per cent of one standard deviation of
the GDP growth (column 2, table 4.3). Table 4.3 (columns 5, 6, 7 and 8) and table 4.4
(using cyclical components) also offer evidence confirming that prices of the four
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most important Colombian export goods, in particular oil, are the ones that lead the
short-run effect on output.
4.3.3 Robustness tests
The results in section 4.3.2 are robust to the inclusion of the control variables:
lending interest rates, exchange rates, net financial flows, and quarterly growth of US
GDP (table 4.5). The estimate for DLTOTCL not only remains significant at 1 per
cent in most of the regressions (at 5 per cent in column 4) but also its magnitude is
stable.
In order to expose the results to a stronger robustness test, lagged control
variables are included. These variables were found independently significant when
running a regression for DLGDP. These variables are: DNIR and DLGDPUS (both
lagged two quarters). Once these variables are included, only DNIR (-2) remains
significant (columns 1 and 3, table 4.6). The estimates for standardised DLTOTCL
are still robust and the total effect, including persistence, explains 30 per cent of GDP
variability (column 4).
Results for standardised variables (column 4, table 4.6) also report a
theoretically consistent negative effect of DNIR (-2), which is significant and
important in magnitude. Although the estimate is not robust when ARMA
components are removed, the inclusion of DNIR (-2) increases the R 2 from 0.17 to
0.39. Although it is true that the purpose of this paper is not to evaluate either the
model’s forecasting properties or the robustness in the estimate for the effect of DNIR
(-2), the negative estimate, along with a higher R 2 , may be reflecting that DNIR is
acting through investment which is the aggregate demand component whose
variations explain most of the short run variation in GDP. Although investment is one
fourth of the Colombian GDP while consumption is two thirds, investment is the most
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volatile component of the GDP (its standard deviation is 8 times greater than
consumption’s). An initial exploration of the channels in aggregate demand relevant
to understanding more deeply the significant and robust effect of terms of trade on
output fluctuations in Colombia (table 4.7) suggest that investment (DLI) is the main
channel. One standard deviation in DLTOTCL seems to explain one third of the
variability in investment (only for the contemporaneous effect). Future research will
be oriented toward examining what type of investment terms of trade shocks are
fostering in the short run. This might also require a better understanding of the
mechanisms through which terms of trade may affect the credit markets and interest
rates. The next channel suggested in table 7, but apparently less responsive, is public
expenditure (DLG). Finally, the current account (DLX for exports and DLM for
imports) does not seem to be correlated with terms of trade in the short run.
4.4 Concluding remarks
Although it is sometimes claimed that a positive correlation between the terms
of trade and aggregate output can be established a priori, a vast literature describes the
complexity in the relationship of these two variables. First, not only a positive but
also a negative correlation has been found in some developing countries. Second, the
usual theoretical framework used to describe open small economies permits outcomes
in which the relationship can be negative or null. A lot depends on the plausibility of
the assumptions made for a particular economy and the way in which domestic
markets adjust after external shocks. The idea of an ambiguous effect has lately been
part of a debate in Colombia about the perverse effects of the terms of trade and the
well-known Dutch Disease. This outcome that is commonly associated with the long
run might also act in the short run depending on how fast possible contractionary
effects of a commodity price boom can be transmitted.
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This study finds that the estimate of the impact of the terms of trade on GDP is
not only significantly positive but also very important in magnitude. Around one third
of one standard deviation of quarterly GDP growth is explained by one standard
deviation in the growth of the terms of trade. The results are robust to different
specifications that include: price components of the terms of trade, alternative
definitions of business cycles, and control variables whose omission might lead to a
biased estimate.
In addition, depreciation of the nominal exchange rate does not seem to have a
significant short run effect as stated by the contractionary devaluation hypothesis.
This might be important when analysing potential new policies, costly or
distortionary, oriented toward controlling the appreciation of the nominal exchange
rate that Colombia and other developing countries have been lately experiencing.
Likewise, this short run dynamic might complement analysis that suggests that
devaluation is a useful tool for growth. On the other hand, this paper finds preliminary
evidence that supports the negative effect of the lending interest rate on output
fluctuations.
In summary, this paper finds robust evidence, supporting the hypothesis that
the terms of trade have an important role in the determination of the short-run
variations of the Colombian GDP over the period 1994-2011. Results from simple
specifications for stationary series justified by time series tests (cointegration and
Granger) along with the particular features of the Colombian economy suggest that
the terms of trade are exogenous and a source of the output fluctuations as described
in the three goods model for a dependent economy. At least in the short run, evidence
does not indicate that eventual negative effects of the terms of trade (Dutch Disease),
if they exist, can offset the positive effects on aggregate output.
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Preliminary evidence also indicates that investment may be the most important
demand component driving the aggregate outcome. One limitation of this study is the
use of aggregate data. Therefore, a future extension would be to study the relationship
between terms of trade and investment demand disaggregated by components and by
industrial sectors to determine the foundation of the observed fast adjustment of the
external shocks in the short run. Future research related to this finding will also
explore short run effects of terms of trade fluctuations on credit markets, interest
rates, and investment in Colombia. These studies would allow evaluating in more
detail the mechanisms behind the quick investment and output responses to external
shocks.
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4. 5 Tables and figures chapter 4

Table 4.1: Granger causality test
Null Hypothesis: DLGDP does not Granger cause DLTOTCL

p-value
observations

Lag length 1

Lag length 2

Lag length 3

Lag length 4

0.80
60

0.79
59

0.82
58

0.52
57

Null Hypothesis: DLTOTCL does not Granger cause DLGDP
p-value
observations

0.15
60

0.41
59
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0.33
58

0.22
57

Table 4.2: Terms of trade and output fluctuations I
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Table 4.3: Terms of trade and output fluctuations II (alternative definitions)
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Table 4.4: Terms of Trade and Output Fluctuations III (cyclical components)

TOTCLt

Observations

F-statistic (p-value)

Schwarz criterion

Akaike info criterion

S.E. of regression (x100.000)

Prob. Chi-Square (Breusch-Godfrey)

Durbin h.

Estimate

Adjusted R2

Dependent variable: GDP (cyclical component)

542217**
(2.42)

0.75 0.59 0.80

5.7 29.41 29.58 0.00

61

2170543**
(2.36)

0.74 0.73 0.85

5.3 29.29 29.45 0.00

69

PXt

14030*
(1.95)

0.74 0.72 0.66

5.4 29.31 29.47 0.00

69

PIt

-105.4
(-0.01)

0.72 0.89 0.72

5.6 29.36 29.52 0.00

69

PXCLt

5928***
(3.00)

0.74 0.53 0.75

5.6 29.39 29.56 0.00

61

OILPRt

12718**
(2.64)

0.74 0.59 0.75

5.7 29.41 29.6 0.00

61

TOTTt

(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Least Squares and MA derivatives that use accurate numeric methods.
Consistent standard errors. AR(1) MA(2) MA(3) included but not reported.
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Table 4.5: Robustness to additional variables I
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Table 4.6: Robustness to additional variables II (Including lags)
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Table 4.7: Terms of trade and aggregate demand Components (OLS regressions)
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Figure 4.1: Real GDP and terms of trade (logarithmic scaling)

Figure 4.2: First difference of the logarithm of the GDP
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Figure 4.3: Correlation DLGDP vs. DLTOTCL

Figure 4.4: Correlation cyclical components of GDP and TOTCL
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has addressed several questions regarding the long- and
short-run macroeconomic effects of the Great Recession in 2009 on Latin America.
Regarding the long-run: (i) has economic growth in Latin America followed a
tradable-led or export-led growth regime in the last sixty years? and (ii) since the
Great Recession changed the trade/financial conditions of the world economy through
the import growth deceleration in advanced economies and shrinkage of global
imbalances, how may these new features of the world economy affect the
continuation of the main Latin American growth regime?
In terms of the short-run: (i) is there evidence about the existence of an output
co-movement between the United States and Latin America in the last sixty years? (ii)
is this synchronization intensified by the relative importance of the United States as
an export market? (iii) is this co-movement stronger for primary or for non-primary
commodity exporters? (iv) do the results on business cycle synchronization, based on
historical data, resemble the uneven performance of the Latin American economies
during the Great Recession in 2009? (v) what is the role of terms of trade shocks to
explain output fluctuations in a primary commodity Latin American exporter:
Colombia?
The main answers to these questions are the following. First, this dissertation
finds that economic growth in Latin America, in the period 1953-2009, has mainly
been based on one interpretation of the term export-led growth: net-export led growth.
After evaluating the relative role of several potential growth regimes, this study
provides robust statistical evidence suggesting that current account surpluses are a
positive and significant correlate of medium- long-run growth rates in Latin America.

124

Although the mechanisms may be numerous, the study suggests than in addition to
the idea that current account surpluses simply reflect an increase of net demand for
domestic output, current account surpluses may also be associated with lower interest
rates paid by investors, which leads to capital accumulation and growth in a capital
constrained developing economy. Indeed, current account surpluses may work as
collateral allowing the developing economy to have a better access to the international
market of financial capital. Given the role of the net-export led growth regime,
shrinkage in global imbalances, as a result of the income adjustments in advanced
economies, certainly becomes a binding constraint for economic growth in Latin
America. In fact, smaller current account deficits in industrialized economies and a
lower margin for developing economies to run current account surpluses are two sides
of the same coin. Unless Latin America pursues a different growth regime, this time,
for example, based on the expansion of domestic markets, its long run performance is
vulnerable in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
Second, regarding the short-run context, this study finds evidence supporting
the presence of an output co-movement between the United States and Latin America.
This co-movement is particularly important before China’s economic activity became
an important correlate of the Latin American output fluctuations in the second half of
the first decade of the 2000’s. The econometric analysis, focusing on trade-related and
structure-related aspects of Latin America, also finds that non-primary commodity
exporters, in particular those that export manufacturing goods to the United States,
display a stronger synchronization of business cycles with the northern economy.
Interestingly, the findings, based on historical data (1961-2012) resemble the uneven
performance of Latin American economies in 2009. The contraction of the US GDP
in 2009 seems to have had a greater growth spillover effect on Latin American non-
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primary commodity exporters and on countries whose exports are mainly oriented to
the United States. Finally, the dissertation finds that terms of the trade explain around
one third of the output fluctuations in Colombia, a primary commodity exporter that
faces exogenous terms of trade. This result is consistent with the idea that following
an income shock in advanced economies price adjustments in exports are relatively
more important than export adjustments for primary commodity exporters. In a very
simple supply and demand background, this aspect may occur because the export
supply of primary commodities is inelastic.
To sum up, this dissertation evaluates the role of external-related factors on
the Latin American macroeconomic performance associated with the trade collapse,
the deceleration of import growth in advanced economies, and shrinkage in global
imbalances, all of them features that currently characterize the world economy as a
consequence of the Great Recession. These external-related factors are particularly
important in Latin American economies since these economies resemble the
assumptions of open-small-dependent economies with negligible market power in the
advanced economies markets.
Some straightforward ideas motivated by this dissertation may be explored in
future research. For example: (i) to develop a more clear identification strategy to
evaluate the role of current account surpluses as a correlate of economic growth in
Latin America. Although chapter 2 presents several arguments suggesting that the
causality runs from the proxy of net-export led growth (current account surplus as a
proportion of GDP) toward economic growth (i.e. Granger causality tests, stylized
facts on the relationship between economic growth and current account deficits), it
may be worth thinking of a good instrumental variable for this proxy, (ii) even though
it was out beyond the scope of Chapter 3 to present a theoretical framework
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describing the uneven effects of income shocks in an advanced economy on primary
vs. non-primary exporters that resemble the assumption of open-small developing
economies, a theoretical framework may help clarify, for example, the role of the
income elasticity of demand in different advanced economies markets, and the role of
the price elasticity of the export supply in primary and non-primary exporters. It
would also be interesting to use the econometric specification in Chapter 2 to show if
terms of trade are relatively more important for primary Latin American commodity
exporters than for countries specialized in manufacturing goods in the determination
of the output co-movement with advanced economies. Finally, the results in Chapter
3, suggesting the presence of business cycles synchronization between Latin America
and other developing economies, also suggest the existence of some commonality in
the output fluctuations in the developing world that may be revisited. This task
requires the evaluation of other mechanisms (i.e. financial) that have been ignored in
this study.
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